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GLOBAL SECURITY: THE HUMAN DIMENSION

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EDITOR'S NOTE:

In 1980, then presidential candidate Ronald Reagan told *The Wall Street Journal* that the "Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they [sic] weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hotspots in the world." Sixteen years later, the Soviet Union is gone, but hotspots are still here.

How to explain the hotspots' continued existence? With no Soviet Union to kick around anymore, a host of alternative explanations has cropped up. But as this issue of *Current History* shows, the root causes, which Michael Klare identifies in his introductory essay as economic, demographic, sociological, and environmental, could have been identified in 1980. In 1980, however, ideology determined how the world was viewed—not empirical observation, and not the political science Isaiah Berlin has defined as "the science of the relationships of human beings to each other and to their environment."

With this issue *Current History* attempts to describe those relationships without subscribing to an overarching, in-search-of-enemies explanation that requires recourse to civilizational fault lines, ends of history, or anarchic or even chaotic forces. The results may not be politically satisfying, or tidy, but they are a first step toward understanding a world stripped of a Manichaean rendering.

"The major international schisms of the twenty-first century will not always be definable in geographic terms. Many of the most severe and persistent threats to global peace and stability are arising not from conflicts between major political entities but from increased discord within states, societies, and civilizations along ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, caste, or class lines. . . This is not to say that traditional geopolitical divisions no longer play a role in world security affairs. But it does suggest that such divisions may have been superseded in importance by the new global schisms."

Redefining Security:
The New Global Schisms

MICHAEL T. KLARE

Geopolitical boundaries—notably those separating rival powers and major military blocs—have constituted the principal "fault lines" of international politics during much of the twentieth century. Throughout the cold war, the world's greatest concentrations of military strength were to be found along such key dividing lines as the Iron Curtain between East and West in Europe and the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea.

When the cold war ended, many of these boundaries quickly lost their geopolitical significance. With the reunification of Germany and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the divide between East and West in Europe ceased to have any meaning. Other key boundaries—for example, the demilitarized zone in Korea—retained their strategic importance, but elsewhere thousands of miles of previously fortified frontier became open borders with a minimal military presence. The strategic alliances associated with these divisions also lost much of their promi-

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nence: the Warsaw Treaty Organization was eliminated altogether, while NATO was given new roles and missions in order to forestall a similar fate.

BATTLE LINES OF THE FUTURE

The changes associated with the cold war's end have been so dramatic and profound that it is reasonable to question whether traditional assumptions regarding the nature of global conflict will continue to prove reliable in the new, post–cold war era. In particular, one could question whether conflicts between states (or groups of states) will remain the principal form of international strife, and whether the boundaries between them will continue to constitute the world's major fault lines. Certainly the outbreak of ethnonationalist conflict in the former Yugoslavia and several other former communist states has focused fresh attention on internal warfare, as has the persistence of tribal and religious strife in such countries as Afghanistan, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan.

Nevertheless, traditional concepts retain great currency among security analysts. Although the Iron Curtain has disappeared, it is argued, similar schisms of a geographic or territorial nature will arise to take its place. Indeed, several theories have been advanced positing the likely location of these schisms.

Some analysts contend that the territorial schisms of earlier periods—notably those produced by military competition among the major powers—will be revived in the years ahead. Professor Kenneth Waltz of the University of California at Berkeley suggests that such competition will eventually reappear, with Germany, Japan, or some other rising power such as China building its military strength in order to contest America's global paramountcy. "Countries have always competed for wealth and security, and the competition has often led to conflict," he wrote in *International Security's* summer 1993 issue. "Why should the future be different from the past?"

More novel, perhaps, is the suggestion that the principal schisms of the post–cold war era are to be found along the peripheries of the world's great civilizations: Western (including Europe and North America), Slavic-Orthodox (including Russia, Ukraine, and Serbia), Japanese, Islamic, Confucian (China), Latin American, and African. First propounded by Harvard's Samuel Huntington in the summer 1993 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, this argument holds that the economic and ideological antagonisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries will be superseded in the twenty-first by antagonisms over culture and cultural identity. "Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs," Huntington wrote, "but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations." Although the boundaries between civilizations are not as precise as those between sovereign states, he noted, these loose frontiers will be the site of major conflict. "The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future."

Others have argued that the world's future fault lines will fall not between the major states or civilizations, but between the growing nexus of democratic, market-oriented societies and those "holdout" states that have eschewed democracy or defied the world community in other ways. Such "pariah" states or "rogue" powers are said to harbor aggressive inclinations, to support terrorism, and to seek the production of nuclear or chemical weapons. "[We] must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family [of nations] but also to assault its basic values," wrote President Clinton's national security adviser, Anthony Lake, in the March-April 1994 *Foreign Affairs*. Lake placed several nations in this category—Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya—and other writers have added Sudan and Syria. But while there is disagreement about which of these states might actually fall into the "outlaw" category, Lake and other proponents of this analysis hold that the United States and its allies must work together to "contain" the rogue states and frustrate their aggressive designs.

While these assessments of the world security environment differ in many of their particulars, they share a common belief that the "battle lines of the future" (to use Huntington's expression) will fall along geographically defined boundaries, with the contending powers (and their friends and allies) arrayed on opposite sides. This, in turn, leads to similar policy recommendations that generally entail the maintenance of sufficient military strength by the United States to defeat any potential adversary or combination of adversaries.

It is certainly understandable that many analysts have proceeded from traditional assumptions regarding the nature of conflict when constructing models of future international relations, but it is not at all apparent that such assessments will prove reliable. While a number of crises since the end of the cold war appear to have followed one of the three models described, many have not. Indeed, the most intense conflicts of the current period—including those in Algeria, Angola, Bosnia, Burma, Burundi, Haiti, Kashmir, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan—cannot be fully explained using these models. Moreover, other forms of contemporary violence—terrorism, racial and religious strife, gang warfare, violence against women, and criminal violence—have shown no respect for geography or civilizational identity whatsoever, erupting in virtually every corner of the world.

THE THREAT FROM WITHIN

A fresh assessment of the world security environment suggests that the major international schisms of the twenty-first century will not always be definable in geographic terms. Many of the most severe and persistent threats to global peace and stability are arising not from conflicts between major political entities but from increased discord within states, societies, and civilizations along ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, caste, or class lines.

The intensification and spread of internal discord is a product of powerful stresses on human communities everywhere. These stresses—economic, demographic, sociological, and environmental—are exacerbating the existing divisions within societies and creating entirely new ones. As a result, we are

seeing the emergence of new or deepened fissures across international society, producing multiple outbreaks of intergroup hostility and violence. These cleavages cannot be plotted on a normal map, but can be correlated with other forms of data: economic performance, class stratification, population growth, ethnic and religious composition, environmental deterioration, and so on. Where certain conditions prevail—a widening gulf between rich and poor, severe economic competition between neighboring ethnic and religious communities, the declining habitability of marginal lands—internal conflict is likely to erupt.

This is not to say that traditional geopolitical divisions no longer play a role in world security affairs. But it does suggest that such divisions may have been superseded in importance by the new global schisms.

FOR RICHER
AND POORER: THE WIDENING GAP

The world has grown much richer over the past 25 years. According to the Worldwatch Institute, the world's total annual income rose from $10.1 trillion in 1970 to approximately $20 trillion in 1994 (in constant 1987 dollars). This increase has been accompanied by an improved standard of living for many of the world's peoples. But not all nations, and not all people in the richer nations, have benefited from the global increase in wealth: some countries, mostly concentrated in Africa and Latin America, have experienced a net decline in gross domestic product over the past few decades, while many of the countries that have achieved a higher GDP have experienced an increase in the number of people living in extreme poverty. Furthermore, the gap in national income between the richest and the poorest nations continues to increase, as does the gap between rich and poor people within most societies.

These differentials in economic growth rates, along with the widening gap between rich and poor, are producing dangerous fissures in many societies. As the masses of poor see their chances of escaping acute poverty diminish, they are likely to become increasingly resentful of those whose growing wealth is evident. This resentment is especially pronounced in the impoverished shantytowns that surround many of the seemingly prosperous cities of the third world. In these inhospitable surroundings, large numbers of people—especially among the growing legions of unemployed youth—are being attracted to extremist political movements like the Shining Path of Peru and the Islamic Salvation Front of Alge-

SOURCES OF HUMAN INSECURITY	
Income	1.3 billion people in developing countries live in poverty; 200 million people live below the poverty line in industrial countries.
Clean Water	1.3 billion people in developing countries do not have access to safe water.
Literacy	900 million adults worldwide are illiterate.
Food	800 million people in developing countries have inadequate food supplies; 500 million of this number are chronically malnourished, and 175 million are under the age of five.
Housing	500 million urban dwellers worldwide are homeless or do not have adequate housing; 100 million young people are homeless.
Preventable Death	Between 15 million and 20 million people die annually because of starvation or disease aggravated by malnutrition; 10 million people die each year because of substandard housing, unsafe water, or poor sanitation in densely populated cities.

Source: Adapted from Michael Renner, *Fighting for Survival: Environmental Decline, Social Conflict, and the New Age of Insecurity* (New York: Norton, 1996), p. 81.

ria, or to street gangs and drug-trafficking syndicates. The result is an increase in urban crime and violence.

Deep economic cleavages are also emerging in China and the postcommunist states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Until the recent introduction of market reforms in these countries, the financial gap between rich and poor was kept relatively narrow by state policy, and such wealth as did exist among the bureaucratic elite was kept well hidden from public view. With the onset of capitalism the economic plight of the lowest strata of these societies has become considerably worse, while the newly formed entrepreneurial class has been able to accumulate considerable wealth— and to display it in highly conspicuous ways. This has generated new class tensions and provided ammunition for those who, like Gennadi Zyuganov of Russia's reorganized Communist Party, seek the restoration of the old, state-dominated system.

Equally worrisome is the impact of growing income differentials on intergroup relations in multiethnic societies. In most countries the divide between rich and poor is not the only schism that matters: of far greater significance are the divisions between various strata of the poor and lower middle class. When such divisions coincide with ethnic or religious differences—that is, when one group of poor people finds itself to be making less economic progress than a similar group of a different ethnic composition—the result is likely to be increased ethnic antagonisms and, at the extreme, increased intergroup violence. This is evident in Pakistan, where violent gang warfare in Karachi has been fueled by economic competition between the indigenous inhabitants of the surrounding region and several waves of Muslim immigrants from India and Bangladesh; it is also evident in Sri Lanka, where efforts by the Sinhalese to deny employment opportunities to the Tamils helped spark a deadly civil war.

KINDLING ETHNIC STRIFE

According to information assembled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ethnic and religious strife figured prominently in all but 3 of the 31 major armed conflicts under way in 1994. And while several long-running ethnic and sectarian conflicts have subsided in recent years, most analysts believe that such strife is likely to erupt repeatedly in the years ahead.

It is true that many recent ethnic and religious conflicts have their roots in clashes or invasions that occurred years ago. It is also true that the violent upheavals that broke out in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union drew upon deep-seated ethnic hostilities, even if these cleavages were not generally visible during much of the communist era (when overt displays of ethnic antagonism were prohibited by government decree). In this sense, the ethnic fissures that are now receiving close attention from international policymakers are not really new phenomena. Nevertheless, many of these schisms have become more pronounced since the end of the cold war, or have exhibited characteristics that are unique to the current era.

Greatly contributing to the intensity of recent ethnic and religious strife is the erosion or even disappearance of central state authority in poor third world countries experiencing extreme economic,

political, and environmental stress. In such countries—especially Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, and Zaire—the flimsy state structures established after independence are simply unable to cope with the demands of housing and feeding their growing populations with the meager resources at hand. In such circumstances people lose all confidence in the state's ability to meet their basic needs and turn instead to more traditional, kinship-based forms of association for help in getting by—a process that often results in competition and conflict among groups over what remains of the nation's scarce resources. This shift in loyalty from the state to group identity is also evident in Bosnia and parts of the former Soviet Union, where various ethnic factions have attempted to seize or divide up the infrastructure (and in some cases the territory) left behind by the communist regime.

Also contributing to the intensity of intergroup conflict in the current era is the spread of mass communications and other instruments of popular mobilization. These advances have contributed to what Professor James Rosenau of George Washington University calls a "skill revolution" in which individual citizens "have become increasingly competent in assessing where they fit in international affairs and how their behavior can be aggregated into significant collective outcomes."[1] This competence can lead to calls for greater personal freedom and democracy. But it can also lead to increased popular mobilization along ethnic, religious, caste, and linguistic lines, often producing great friction and disorder within heterogeneous societies. An important case in point is India, where Hindu nationalists have proved adept at employing modern means of communication and political organization—while retaining traditional symbols and motifs—to encourage anti-Muslim sentiment and thereby erode the authority of India's largely secular government.

DEMOGRAPHIC SCHISMS

According to the most recent UN estimates, total world population is expected to soar from approximately 5.6 billion people in 1994 to somewhere between 8 billion and 12 billion by the year 2050—an increase that will undoubtedly place great strain on the earth's food production and environmental capacity. But the threat to the world's environment and food supply is not all that we have to worry about. Because population growth is occurring unevenly in different areas, with some of the highest rates of growth to be found in countries with the

[1] James N. Rosenau, "Security in a Turbulent World," *Current History*, May 1995, p. 194.

slowest rates of economic growth, future population increases could combine with other factors to exacerbate existing cleavages along ethnic, religious, and class lines.

Overall, the populations of the less-developed countries (LDCs) are growing at a much faster rate than those of the advanced industrial nations. As a result, the share of world population accounted for by the LDCs rose from 69 percent in 1960 to 74 percent in 1980, and is expected to jump to nearly 80 percent in the year 2000. Among third world countries, moreover, there have been marked variations in the rate of population growth: while the newly industrialized nations of East Asia have experienced a sharp decline in the rate of growth, Africa and parts of the Middle East have experienced an increase. If these trends persist, the global distribution of population will change dramatically over the next few decades, with some areas experiencing a substantial increase in total population and others moderate or even negligible growth.

This is where other factors enter the picture. If the largest increases in population were occurring in areas of rapid economic growth, the many young adults entering the job market each year would be able to find productive employment and would thus be able to feed and house their families. In many cases, however, large increases in population are coinciding with low or stagnant economic growth, meaning that future job-seekers are not likely to find adequate employment. This will have a considerable impact on the world security environment. At the very least, it is likely to produce increased human migration from rural areas (where population growth tends to be greatest) to urban centers (where most new jobs are to be found), and from poor and low-growth countries to more affluent ones. The former process is resulting in the rapid expansion of many third world cities, with an attendant increase in urban crime and intergroup friction (especially where the new urban dwellers are of a different ethnic or tribal group from the original settlers); the latter is producing huge numbers of new immigrants in the developed and high-growth countries, often sparking hostility and sometimes violence from the indigenous populations.

Rapid population growth in poor countries with slow or stagnant economic growth has other impli-

Greatly contributing to the intensity of recent ethnic and religious strife is the erosion or even disappearance of central state authority in poor third world countries experiencing extreme economic, political, and environmental stress.

cations for world security. In many societies it is leading to the hyperutilization of natural resources, particularly arable soil, grazing lands, forests, and fisheries, a process that severely complicates future economic growth (as vital raw materials are depleted) and accelerates the pace of environmental decline. It can also overwhelm the capacity of weak or divided governments to satisfy their citizens' basic needs, leading eventually to the collapse of states and to the intergroup competition and conflict described earlier. Finally, it could generate fresh international conflicts when states with slow population growth employ stringent measures to exclude immigrants from nearby countries with high rates of growth. While some of this is speculative, early signs of many of these phenomena have been detected. The 1994 United States intervention in Haiti, for instance, was partly motivated by a desire on Washington's part to curb the flow of Haitian "boat people" to the United States.

ENDANGERED BY ENVIRONMENT

As with massive population growth, the world has been bombarded in recent years with dire predictions about the consequences of further deterioration in the global environment. The continuing build-up of industrial gases in the earth's outer atmosphere, for example, is thought to be impeding the natural radiation of heat from the planet and thereby producing a gradual increase in global temperatures—a process known as "greenhouse warming." If such warming continues, global sea levels will rise, deserts will grow, and severe drought could afflict many important agricultural zones. Other forms of environmental degradation—the thinning of the earth's outer ozone layer, the depletion of arable soil through overcultivation, the persistence of acid rain caused by industrial emissions—could endanger human health and survival in other ways. As with population growth, these environmental effects will not be felt uniformly around the world but will threaten some states and groups more than others, producing new cleavages in human society.

The uneven impact of global environmental decline is being seen in many areas. The first to suffer are invariably those living in marginally habitable areas—arid grazing lands, coastal lowlands, tropical rainforests. As annual rainfall declines, sea lev-

els rise, and forests are harvested, these lands become uninhabitable. The choice, for those living in such areas, is often grim: to migrate to the cities, with all of their attendant problems, or to move onto the lands of neighboring peoples (who may be of a different ethnicity or religion), producing new outbreaks of intergroup violence. This grim choice has fallen with particular severity on indigenous peoples, who in many cases were originally driven into these marginal habitats by more powerful groups. A conspicuous case in point is the Amazon region of Brazil, where systematic deforestation is destroying the habitat and lifestyle of the indigenous peoples and producing death, illness, and unwelcome migration to the cities.

States also vary in their capacity to cope with environmental crisis and the depletion of natural resources. While the wealthier countries can rebuild areas damaged by flooding or other disasters, relocate displaced citizens to safer regions, and import food and other commodities no longer produced locally, the poorer countries are much less capable of doing these things. As noted by Professor Thomas Homer-Dixon of the University of Toronto, "Environmental scarcity sharply raises financial and political demands on government by requiring huge spending on new infrastructure."[2] Because many third world countries cannot sustain such expenditures, he notes, "we have. . .the potential for a widening gap between demands on the state and its financial ability to meet these demands"—a gap that could lead to internal conflict between competing ethnic groups, or significant out-migration to countries better able to cope with environmental stresses.[3]

Finally, there is a danger that acute environmental scarcities will lead to armed interstate conflict over such vital resources as water, forests, and energy supplies. Some believe that the era of "resource wars" has already occurred in the form of recurring conflict over the Middle East's oil supplies and that similar conflicts will arise over control of major sources of water, such as the Nile, Euphrates, and Ganges Rivers.

THE NEW CARTOGRAPHY

These new and growing schisms are creating a map of international security that is based on economic, demographic, and environmental factors. If this map could be represented in graphic terms, it would show an elaborate network of fissures stretching across human society in all directions—producing large concentrations of rifts in some areas and smaller clusters in others, but leaving no area entirely untouched. Each line would represent a cleavage in the human community, dividing one group (however defined) from another; the deeper and wider clefts, and those composed of many fault lines, would indicate the site of current or potential conflict.

These schisms, and their continued growth, will force policymakers to rethink their approach to international security. It is no longer possible to rely on strategies of defense and diplomacy that assume a flat, two-dimensional world of contending geopolitical actors. While such units still play a significant role in world security affairs, they are not the only actors that matter; nor is their interaction the only significant threat to peace and stability. Other actors, and other modes of interaction, are equally important. Only by considering the full range of security threats will it be possible for policymakers to design effective strategies for peace.

When the principal fault lines of international security coincided with the boundaries between countries, it was always possible for individual states to attempt to solve their security problems by fortifying their borders or by joining with other nations in regional defense systems like NATO and the Warsaw Pact. When the fault lines fall *within* societies, however, there are no clear boundaries to be defended and no role for traditional alliance systems. Indeed, it is questionable whether there is a role for military power at all: any use of force by one side in these disputes, however successful, will inevitably cause damage to the body politic as a whole, eroding its capacity to overcome the problems involved and to provide for its long-term stability. Rather than fortifying and defending borders, a successful quest for peace must entail strategies for easing and erasing the rifts in society, by eliminating the causes of dissension or finding ways to peacefully bridge the gap between mutually antagonistic groups.

The new map of international security will not replace older, traditional types. The relations between states will still matter in world affairs, and their interactions may lead, as they have in the past, to major armed conflicts. But it will not be possible to promote international peace and stability without using the new map as well, and dealing with the effects of the new global schisms. Should we fail to do so, the world of the next century could prove as violent as the present one. ∎

[2]Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity and Intergroup Conflict," in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds., *World Security: Challenges for a New Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 298-299.
[3]ibid.

Environmental Scarcity, Mass Violence, and the Limits to Ingenuity

Thomas F. Homer-Dixon

Scarcities of critical environmental resources—in particular cropland, freshwater, and forests—are contributing to mass violence in several areas of the world. While these "environmental scarcities" do not cause wars between countries, they do sometimes sharply aggravate stresses within countries, helping stimulate ethnic clashes, urban unrest, and insurgencies. This violence affects Western national interests by destabilizing trade and economic relations, provoking migrations, and generating complex humanitarian disasters that divert militaries and absorb huge amounts of aid.

Policymakers and citizens in the West ignore these pressures at their peril. In Chiapas, Mexico, Zapatista insurgents recently rose against land scarcity and insecure land tenure produced by long-standing inequalities in land distribution, by rapid population growth among groups with the least land, and by changes in laws governing land access. The insurgency rocked Mexico to the core, helped trigger the peso crisis, and reminded the world that Mexico remains—despite the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the pretenses of the country's elites—a poor and profoundly unstable developing country.

In Pakistan, shortages and the maldistribution of good land, water, and forests have encouraged the migration of huge numbers of rural poor into major cities such as Karachi and Hyderabad. The conjunction of this in-migration with high fertility rates is causing urban populations to grow at a staggering 4 to 5 percent a year, producing fierce competition and often violence among ethnic groups over land, basic services, and political and economic power. This turmoil exacts a huge cost on the national economy. It may also encourage the Pakistani regime to buttress its internal legitimacy by adopting a more belligerent foreign policy on issues such as Kashmir and nuclear proliferation.

In South Africa, severe land, water, and fuelwood scarcity in the former black homelands has helped drive millions of poor blacks into teeming squatter settlements in the major cities. The settlements are often constructed on the worst urban land, in depressions prone to flooding, on hillsides vulnerable to slides, or near heavily polluting industries. Scarcities of land, water, and fuelwood in these settlements provoke interethnic rivalry and violent feuds between settlement warlords and their followers. This strife jeopardizes the country's transition to democratic stability and prosperity.[1]

THREE FORMS OF SCARCITY

It is easy for the 1 billion or so people living in rich countries to forget that the well-being of about half the world's population of 5.8 billion remains

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[1]Over the last six years a diverse group of 100 experts from 15 countries has closely studied cases such as these. Organized by the Peace and Conflict Studies program at the University of Toronto and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge, Massachusetts, its research and that of other groups provides a clear picture of how and where environmental scarcity produces social breakdown and violence. This article surveys these findings.

directly tied to local natural resources. Nearly 3 billion people rely on agriculture for their main income; perhaps 1 billion of these are subsistence farmers who survive by eating what they grow. More than 40 percent of the world's people—some 2.2 billion—use fuelwood, charcoal, straw, or cow dung as their main source of energy; 50 to 60 percent rely on these biomass fuels for at least some of their energy needs. Over 1.2 billion people lack access to clean drinking water.

The cropland, forests, and water supplies that underpin the livelihoods and well-being of these billions are renewable. Unlike nonrenewable resources such as oil and iron ore, renewables are replenished over time by natural processes. If used prudently, they should sustain an adequate standard of living indefinitely. Unfortunately, in the majority of regions where people are highly dependent on renewable resources, these resources are being depleted or degraded faster than they are being renewed. From Gaza and the Philippines to Honduras, the evidence is stark: aquifers are being overdrawn and salinized, coastal fisheries are disappearing, and steep uplands have been stripped of their forests, leaving their thin soils to erode into the sea.

These environmental scarcities usually have complex causes. Resource depletion and degradation are a function of the physical vulnerability of the resource, the size of the resource-consuming population, and the technologies and practices this population uses. The size of the population and its technologies and practices are in turn a result of a wide array of other variables, from the status of women to the availability of human and financial capital.

Moreover, resource depletion and degradation, taken together, are only one of three sources of environmental scarcity. Depletion and degradation produce a decrease in total resource *supply*—that is, a decrease in the size of the total resource "pie." But population growth and changes in consumption behavior can also cause greater scarcity by boosting the *demand* for a resource. Thus, if a rapidly growing population depends on a fixed amount of cropland, the amount of cropland per person—the size of each person's slice of the resource pie—falls inexorably. In many countries resource availability is being squeezed by both supply and demand pressures.

The third cause of scarcity is a severe imbalance in the *distribution* of wealth and power, which results in some groups in a society receiving disproportionately large slices of the resource pie while others get slices that are too small to sustain their livelihoods. This unequal distribution, which we call structural scarcity, has been a key factor in every case our research team examined. Often the imbalance is deeply rooted in the institutions and class and ethnic relations inherited from the colonial period. Often it is sustained and reinforced by international economic relations that trap developing countries into dependence on a few raw material exports. It can also be reinforced by heavy external debts that encourage countries to use their most productive environmental resources—such as their best croplands and forests—to generate hard currency rather than to support the most impoverished segments of their populations.

HOW SCARCITIES INTERACT

In the past, scholars and policymakers have usually addressed these three sources of scarcity independently. But supply, demand, and structural scarcities interact and reinforce each other in extraordinarily pernicious ways.

One type of interaction is resource capture. This occurs when powerful groups within a society recognize that a key resource is becoming more scarce (due to both supply and demand pressures) and use their power to shift resource access in their favor. This shift imposes severe structural scarcities on weaker groups. In Chiapas, worsening land scarcity (caused in part by rapid population growth) encouraged powerful landowners and ranchers to exploit weaknesses in the state's land laws in order to seize land from campesinos and indigenous farmers. Gradually these peasants were forced deeper into the state's lowland rain forest, further away from the state's economic heartland and further into poverty.

In the Jordan River basin, Israel's critical dependence on groundwater flowing out of the West Bank—a dependence made acute by a rising Israeli population and salinizing aquifers along the Mediterranean coast—encouraged Israel to restrict groundwater withdrawals on the West Bank during the occupation. These restrictions were far more severe for Palestinians than for Israeli settlers. They contributed to the rapid decline in Palestinian agriculture in the region, to the increasing dependence of young Palestinians on day labor within Israel and, ultimately, to rising frustrations in the Palestinian community.

Another kind of interaction, ecological marginalization, occurs when a structural imbalance in resource distribution joins with rapid population growth to drive resource-poor people into ecologically marginal areas, such as upland hillsides, areas at risk of desertification, and tropical rain forests.

Higher population densities in these vulnerable areas—along with a lack of the capital and knowledge needed to protect local resources—causes resource depletion, poverty, and eventually further migration, often to cities.

Ecological marginalization affects hundreds of millions of people around the world, across an extraordinary range of geographies and economic and political systems. We see the same process in the Himalayas, the Sahel, Central America, Brazil, India's Rajasthan, and Indonesia. For example, in the Philippines an extreme imbalance in cropland distribution between landowners and peasants has interacted with high population growth rates to force large numbers of landless poor into interior upland regions of the archipelago. There, the migrants use slash and burn agriculture to clear land for crops. As millions more arrive from the lowlands, new land becomes hard to find, and as population densities on the steep slopes increase, erosion, landslides, and flash floods become critical. During the 1970s and 1980s, the resulting poverty helped drive many peasants into the arms of the communist New People's Army insurgency that had a stranglehold on upland regions. Poverty drove countless others into wretched squatter settlements in cities like Manila.

> [I]n many cases environmental scarcity powerfully contributes to mass violence.

Of course, many factors unique to the Filipino situation have combined with environmental and demographic stress to produce these outcomes. Environmental scarcity is never a determining or sole cause of large migrations, poverty, or violence; it always joins with other economic, political, and cultural factors to produce its effects. In the Filipino case the lack of clear property rights in upland areas encouraged migration into these regions and discouraged migrants from conserving the land once they arrived. And President Ferdinand Marcos's corrupt and authoritarian leadership reduced regime legitimacy and closed off options for democratic action by aggrieved groups.

Analysts often overlook the importance of such contextual factors and, as a result, jump from evidence of simple correlation to unwarranted conclusions about causation. Thus some commentators have asserted that rapid population growth, severe land scarcity, and the resulting food shortfalls caused the Rwandan genocide. In an editorial in August 1994, *The Washington Post* argued that while the Rwandan civil war was "military, political, and personal in its execution," a key underlying cause was "a merciless struggle for land in a peasant society whose birthrates have put an unsustainable pressure on it." Yet, while environmental scarcities in Rwanda were serious, close analysis shows that the genocide arose mainly from a conventional struggle among elites for control of the Rwandan state. Land scarcity played at most a peripheral role by reducing regime legitimacy in the countryside and restricting alternatives for elite enrichment outside the state.

Despite these caveats, in many cases environmental scarcity powerfully contributes to mass violence. Moreover, it is not possible entirely to subordinate its role to a society's particular institutions and policies. Some skeptics claim that a society can fix its environmental problems by fixing its institutional and policy mistakes; thus, they assert, environmental scarcity's contribution to conflict does not merit independent attention. But our research shows that such arguments are incomplete at best.

First, environmental scarcity is not only a consequence of institutions and policy: it also can reciprocally influence them in harmful ways. For example, during the 1970s and 1980s the prospect of chronic food shortages and a serious drought encouraged governments along the Senegal River to build a series of irrigation and flood-control dams. Because of critical land scarcities elsewhere in the region, land values in the basin shot up. The Mauritanian government, controlled by Moors of Arab origin, then took control of this resource by changing the laws governing land ownership and abrogating the traditional rights of black Mauritanians to farm, herd, and fish along the river.

Second, environmental scarcity should not be subordinated to institutions and policies because it is partly a function of the physical context in which a society is embedded. The original depth of soils in the Filipino uplands and the physical characteristics that make Israel's aquifers vulnerable to salt intrusion are not functions of human social institutions or behavior. And third, once environmental scarcity becomes irreversible (as when a region's vital topsoil washes into the sea), then the scarcity is, by definition, an external influence on society. Even if enlightened reform of institutions and policies removes the original political and economic causes of the scarcity, it will be a continuing burden on society.

RESOURCE SCARCITY
AS A CAUSE OF INTERSTATE WAR

Scarcity-induced resource capture by Moors in Mauritania helped ignite violence over water and

cropland in the Senegal River basin, producing tens of thousands of refugees. Expanding populations, land degradation, and drought spurred the rise of the Shining Path guerrillas in the southern highlands of Peru. In Haiti, forest and soil loss worsens a chronic economic crisis that generates strife and periodic waves of boat people. And land shortages in Bangladesh, exacerbated by fast population growth, have prompted millions of people to migrate to India—an influx that has, in turn, caused ethnic strife in the Indian states of Assam and Tripura.

Close examination of such cases shows that severe environmental scarcity can reduce local food production, aggravate the poverty of marginal groups, spur large migrations, enrich elites who speculate on resources, and undermine a state's moral authority and capacity to govern. These long-term stresses can slowly tear apart a poor society's social fabric, causing chronic popular unrest and violence by boosting grievances and changing the balance of power between contending social groups and the state.

The violence that results is usually chronic and diffuse, and almost always subnational, not international. There is virtually no evidence that environmental scarcity causes major interstate war. Yet among international relations scholars, it has been conventional wisdom for some time that critical scarcities of natural resources can produce international conflict. During the 1970s, for example, Nazli Chourci and Robert North argued that countries facing high resource demands and limited resource availability within their territories would seek the needed resources through trade or conquest beyond their boundaries.[2] Although this "lateral pressure" theory helped explain some past wars, such as World War I, our more recent research highlights a number of the theory's errors. Most important, the theory makes no distinction between renewable and nonrenewable resources.

There is no doubt that some major wars in this century have been motivated in part by one country's desire to seize another's nonrenewable resources, such as fossil fuels or iron ore. For example, before and during World War II, Japan sought to secure coal, oil, and minerals in China and Southeast Asia. But the story is different for renewables

The chronic and diffuse subnational strife that environmental scarcity helps generate is exactly the kind of conflict that bedevils conventional military institutions.

like cropland, forests, fish, and freshwater. It is hard to find clear examples from this century of major war motivated mainly by scarcities of renewables.

There are two possible explanations. First, modern states cannot easily convert cropland and forests seized from a neighbor into increased state power, whereas they can quickly use nonrenewables like iron and oil to build and fuel the military machines of national aggression. Second, countries with economies highly dependent on renewables tend to be poor, and poor countries cannot easily buy large and sophisticated conventional armies to attack their neighbors. For both these reasons, the incentives and the means to launch resource wars are likely to be lower for renewables than for nonrenewables.

The exception, some might argue, is water, especially river water: adequate water supplies are needed for all aspects of national activity, including the production and use of military power, and rich countries are as dependent on water as poor countries (often they are more dependent). Moreover, about 40 percent of the world's population lives in the 214 river basins shared by more than one country. Thus at a meeting in Stockholm in August 1995, Ismail Serageldin, the World Bank's vice president for environmentally sustainable development, declared that the "wars of the next century will be over water," not oil.

The World Bank is right to focus on the water crisis. Water scarcity and pollution are already hindering economic growth in many poor countries. With global water use doubling every 20 years, these scarcities—and the subnational social stresses they cause—are going to get much worse. But Serageldin is wrong to declare that we are about to witness a surge of "water wars."

Wars between upstream and downstream neighbors over river water are likely only in a narrow set of circumstances: the downstream country must be highly dependent on the water for its national well-being; the upstream country must be able to restrict the river's flow; there must be a history of antagonism between the two countries; and, most important, the downstream country must be much stronger militarily than the upstream country.

There are very few river basins around the world where all these conditions hold. The most obvious example is the Nile. Egypt is wholly dependent on the river's water, has historically turbulent relations

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[2] *Nations in Conflict* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1975).

with its upstream neighbors, Sudan and Ethiopia, and is vastly more powerful than either. And Egypt has several times threatened to go to war to guarantee an adequate supply of Nile waters.

But more common is the situation along the Ganges, where India has constructed a huge dam—the Farakka Barrage—with harsh consequences on downstream cropland, fisheries, and villages in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is so weak that the most it can do is plead with India to release more water. There is little chance of a water war here between upstream and downstream countries (although the barrage's effects have contributed to the migrations out of Bangladesh into India). The same holds true for other river basins where alarmists speak of impending wars, including the Mekong, Indus, Paraná, and Euphrates.

PIVOTAL STATES

The chronic and diffuse subnational strife that environmental scarcity helps generate is exactly the kind of conflict that bedevils conventional military institutions. Around the world we see conventional armies pinned down and often utterly impotent in the face of interethnic violence or attacks by ragtag bands of lightly armed guerrillas and insurgents. As yet, environmental scarcity is not a major factor behind most of these conflicts. But we can expect it to become a far more powerful influence in coming decades because of larger populations and higher resource consumption rates.

The world's population is growing by 1.6 percent a year; on average, real economic product per capita is also rising by 1.5 percent a year. These increases combine to boost the earth's total economic product by about 3 percent annually. With a doubling time of approximately 23 years, the current global product of $25 trillion should exceed $50 trillion in today's dollars by 2020.

A large component of this increase will be achieved through greater consumption of the planet's natural resources. Already, as a group of geographers has noted, "transformed, managed, and utilized ecosystems constitute about half of the ice-free earth; human-mobilized material and energy flows rival those of nature."[3] Such changes are certain to grow because of the rapidly increasing scale and intensity of our economic activity.

At the level of individual countries, these changes often produce a truly daunting combination of pressures. Some of the worst-affected countries are "pivotal states"—to use the term recently coined in *Foreign Affairs* by historian Paul Kennedy. These countries—including South Africa, Mexico, India, Pakistan, and China—are key to international stability in their regions.

India deserves particularly close attention. Since independence, it has often seemed on the brink of disintegration. But it has endured, despite enormous difficulties, and by many measures India has made real progress in bettering its citizens' lives. Yet, although recent economic liberalization has produced a surge of growth and a booming middle class, India's prospects are uncertain at best.

Population growth stubbornly remains around 2 percent a year; the country's population of 955 million (of which about 700 million live in the countryside) grows by 17 million people annually, which means it doubles every 38 years. Demographers estimate that India's population will reach 1.4 billion by 2025. Yet severe water scarcities and cropland fragmentation, erosion, and salinization are already widespread. Fuelwood shortages, deforestation, and desertification also affect sweeping areas of countryside.

Rural resource scarcities and population growth have combined with an inadequate supply of rural jobs and economic liberalization in cities to widen wealth differentials between the countryside and urban areas. These differentials propel huge waves of rural-urban migration. The growth rates of many of India's cities are nearly twice that of the country's population, which means that cities like New Delhi, Mumbai, and Bangalore double in size every 20 years. Their infrastructures are overtaxed: New Delhi has among the worst urban air pollution levels in the world, power and water are regularly unavailable, garbage is left in the streets, and the sewage system can handle only a fraction of the city's wastewater.

India's rapidly growing population impedes further loosening of the state's grip on the economy: as the country's workforce expands by 6.5 million a year, and as resentment among the poor rises against those castes and classes that have benefited most from liberalization, left-wing politicians are able to exert strong pressure to maintain subsidies for fertilizers, irrigation, and inefficient industries and to keep statutory restrictions against corporate layoffs. Rapid population growth also leads to fierce competition for limited status and job opportunities

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[3] B. L. Turner et al., eds., *The Earth as Transformed by Human Action: Global and Regional Changes in the Biosphere over the Past 300 Years* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 13.

in government and education. Attempts to hold a certain percentage of such positions for lower castes cause bitter intercaste conflict. The right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party capitalizes on upper- and middle-caste resentment of encroachment on their privileges, mobilizing this resentment against minorities like Muslims.

These pressures are largely beyond the control of India's increasingly corrupt and debilitated political institutions. At the district and state levels, politicians routinely hire local gang leaders or thugs to act as political enforcers. At the national level, kickbacks and bribes have become common in an economic system still constrained by bureaucracy and quotas. The central government and many state governments are widely seen as unable to manage India's rapidly changing needs, and as a result have lost much of their legitimacy. Furthermore, the 1996 national elections dealt a dramatic blow to the Congress Party, which has traditionally acted to aggregate the interests of multiple sectors of Indian society. The parties that gained at Congress's expense represent a profusion of narrow caste, class, religious, and regional interests.

The fast expansion of urban areas in poor countries like India may have the dual effect of increasing both the grievances and the opportunities of groups challenging the state: people concentrated in slums can communicate more easily than those in scattered rural villages, which might reinforce incipient economic frustrations and, by reducing problems of coordination, also increase their power in relation to the police and other authorities. While there is surprisingly little historical correlation between rapid urbanization and civil strife, India shows that the record may be changing: the widespread urban violence in early 1993 was concentrated in the poorest slums. Moreover, although Western commentators usually described the rioting as strictly communal, between Hindus and Muslims, Hindus directed many of their attacks against recent Hindu migrants from rural areas. B. K. Chandrashekar, a sociology professor at the Indian Institute of Management, has noted that "the communal violence was quite clearly a class phenomenon. Indian cities became the main battlegrounds because of massive migrations of the rural poor in the past decades."

Indian social institutions and democracy are now under extraordinary strain. The strain arises from a rapid yet incomplete economic transition, from widening gaps between the wealthy and the poor, from chronically weak political institutions, and—

not least—from continued high levels of population growth and resource depletion. Should India suffer major internal violence as a result—or, in the worst case, should it fragment into contending regions—the economic, migratory, and security consequences for the rest of the world would be staggering.

BANKING ON INGENUITY

Some reading this account of India will say "nonsense!" As long as market reforms and adequate economic growth continue, India should be able to solve its problems of poverty, population growth, and environmental stress.

The most rigorous representatives of this optimistic position are neoclassical economists. They generally claim that few if any societies face strict limits to population or consumption. Properly functioning economic institutions, especially markets, can provide incentives to encourage conservation, resource substitution, the development of new sources of scarce resources, and technological innovation. Increased global trade allows resource-rich areas to specialize in the production of goods (like grain) that are derived from renewables. These optimists are commonly opposed by neo-Malthusians—often biologists and ecologists—who claim that finite natural resources place strict limits on the growth of human population and consumption both globally and regionally; if these limits are exceeded, poverty and social breakdown result.

The debate between these two camps is now thoroughly sterile. Each grasps a portion of the truth, but neither tells the whole story. Neoclassical economists are right to stress the extraordinary ability of human beings to surmount scarcity and improve their lot. The dominant trend over the past two centuries, they point out, has not been rising resource scarcity but increasing aggregate wealth. In other words, most important resources have become less scarce, at least in economic terms.

The optimists provide a key insight: that we should focus on the supply of human ingenuity in response to increasing resource scarcity rather than on strict resource limits. Many societies adapt well to scarcity, without undue hardship to their populations, and often end up better off than they were before. These societies supply enough ingenuity in the form of new technologies and new and reformed social institutions—like efficient markets, clear property rights, and rural development banks—to alleviate the effects of scarcity.

What determines a society's ability to supply this ingenuity? The answer is complex: different

countries, depending on their social, economic, political, and cultural characteristics, will respond to scarcity in different ways and with varying amounts and kinds of ingenuity.

Optimists often make the mistake of assuming that an adequate supply of the right kinds of ingenuity is always assured. However, in the next decades population growth, rising average resource consumption, and persistent inequalities in resource access guarantee that scarcities of renewables will affect many regions in the developing world with a severity, speed, and scale unprecedented in history. Resource substitution and conservation tasks will be more urgent, complex, and unpredictable, increasing the need for many kinds of ingenuity. In other words, these societies will have to be smarter—socially and technically—to maintain or increase their well-being in the face of rising scarcities.

Simultaneously, the supply of ingenuity will be constrained by a number of factors, including the brain drain from many poor societies, their limited access to capital, and their chronically incompetent bureaucracies, corrupt judicial systems, and weak states. Moreover, markets in developing countries often do not work well: property rights are unclear; prices for water, forests, and other common resources do not adjust accurately to reflect rising scarcity; and thus incentives for entrepreneurs to respond to scarcity are inadequate.

Most important, the supply of ingenuity can be restricted by stresses generated by the very resource crises the ingenuity is needed to solve. In Haiti, for example, severe resource shortages—especially of forests and soil—have inflamed struggles among social groups, struggles that, in turn, obstruct technical and institutional reform. Scarcities exacerbate poverty in rural Haitian communities and produce significant profit opportunities for powerful elites. Both deepen divisions and distrust between rich and poor and impede beneficial change. Thus, for example, the Haitian army has blocked reforestation projects by destroying tree seedlings; the army and the notorious Tonton Macoutes fear such projects will bring disgruntled rural people together and threaten their highly profitable control of forest resource extraction.

Similar processes are at work in many places. In the Indian state of Bihar, which has some of the highest population growth rates and rural densities in the country, land scarcity has deepened divisions between land-holding and peasant castes, promoting intransigence on both sides that has brought land reform to a halt. In South Africa, scarcity-driven migrations into urban areas and the resulting conflicts over urban environmental resources (such as land and water) encourage communities to segment along lines of ethnicity or residential status. This segmentation shreds networks of trust and debilitates local institutions. Powerful warlords, linked to the Inkatha Freedom Party or the African National Congress, have taken advantage of these dislocations to manipulate group divisions within communities, often producing violence and further institutional breakdown.

Societies like these may face a widening "ingenuity gap" as their requirement for ingenuity to deal with scarcity rises while their supply of ingenuity stagnates or drops. A persistent and serious ingenuity gap boosts dissatisfaction and undermines regime legitimacy and coercive power, increasing the likelihood of widespread and chronic civil violence. Violence further erodes the society's capacity to supply ingenuity, especially by causing human and financial capital to flee. Countries with a critical ingenuity gap therefore risk entering a downward and self-reinforcing spiral of crisis and decay.

A focus on ingenuity supply helps us rethink the neo-Malthusian concept of strict physical limits to growth. The limits a society faces are a product of both its physical context and the ingenuity it can bring to bear on that context. If a hypothetical society were able to supply infinite amounts of ingenuity, then that society's maximum sustainable population size and rate of resource consumption would be determined by biological and physical laws, such as the second law of thermodynamics. Since infinite ingenuity is never available, the resource limits societies face in the real world are more restrictive than this theoretical maximum. And since the supply of ingenuity depends on many social and economic factors and can therefore vary widely, we cannot determine a society's limits solely by examining its physical context, as neo-Malthusians do. Rather than speaking of limits, it is better to say that some societies are locked into a "race" between a rising requirement for ingenuity and their capacity to supply it.

In coming decades, some societies will win this race and some will lose. We can expect an increasing bifurcation of the world into those societies that can adjust to population growth and scarcity—thus avoiding turmoil—and those that cannot. If several pivotal states fall on the wrong side of this divide, humanity's overall prospects will change dramatically for the worse. ∎

Population, Consumption, and the Path to Sustainability

JANET WELSH BROWN

Is world population growth a problem? Most Americans would answer yes, though they do not think of the United States as being part of the problem. The technological optimists among us claim that, theoretically at least, the planet can feed, clothe, and house 10 billion people. But rapid population growth multiplies poverty and environmental degradation, and a laissez-faire attitude about a world population that will double in the next 50 years will assure that for the poor the world over, life will remain harsh.

Does this mean that rapid population growth is a security problem? Not if one equates security with the traditional struggle of major military powers over scarce resources. But if the world pursues the American model of development, with its high levels of consumption, air and water pollution, and damage to the natural resource base, and extrapolates these effects and population growth to 2025 and 2050, some basic physical and biological systems could be at risk of collapse.[1] Less apocalyptic but just as loaded with the potential for human misery is the possibility that in many countries on the upswing, such as Mexico, Egypt, Kenya, or the Philippines, a downward spiral of population growth, debt, inequality, and loss of soil and agricultural production could lead to economic decline and widespread political instability.

There is time—but not a lot—to control pollution and prevent degradation of the natural resource base. Collectively, countries know better ways of assuring development, and a population stabilizing at 10 billion or 11 billion should be able to live humanely on the planet's resources if governments take the difficult steps required to curb excessive consumption and manage resources sustainably— and if the United States takes the lead.

POPULATION GROWTH NORTH AND SOUTH . . .

Between the Second World War and the 1990s, the world's population increased from 2.5 billion to 5 billion, and the global economy grew fourfold. Most of the population growth occurred in the developing countries, where 80 percent of the world's people live today. Economic activity exploded commensurately, but with the most impressive advances seen in the highly industrialized states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). On a tide of postwar, postindependence economic growth and great reductions in mortality, the quality of life of most people everywhere improved—a fact easily forgotten as headlines of wars and natural disasters repeat themselves.

Using a medium-growth scenario, United Nations population projections promise a world of 8.5 billion people in 2025 and around 10 billion in 2050. Ninety-five percent of the growth will be in developing countries, most of it in the very poorest. The populations of some countries, such as Somalia, Pakistan, Nicaragua, and Honduras, will double in as little as 22 or 23 years. Others—Mexico and Egypt, for instance—will double in 30 years. Even China, which has achieved a remarkable decline in fertility and reached replacement-only levels in the

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[1]For a classic statement of the problem, see Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs, vol. 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989).

early 1990s, will see 17 million people added to its population each year, assuring growth from its current 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion by 2025. India, the second-largest country with 905 million people in 1994, will surpass China in population soon after 2025 because its population is still increasing at 1.9 percent per year. Bangladesh and the Philippines are growing at more than 2 percent annually. (In the next century, half the world's people will live in Asia.) Growth is also rapid in sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab countries. Most population increases in developing countries will take place in cities, and the ranks of the young will swell throughout these countries. Already 45 percent of all Africans are under the age of 15.[2]

What demands does such growth in the developing world put on economies and ecosystems? Food production must more than double in the next 50 years, and the demand for wood, the main fuel in the poorest communities, will also double. (Even now, some cities in African countries are ringed with deforested areas, and in India demand for fuelwood is six times the sustainable yield of India's forests.) Governments must build twice as many schools and clinics, train twice as many teachers and health-care workers, and scramble desperately to keep from slipping back and in the provision of drinking water and sanitation. Twice as many jobs will be needed, just to stay even with population growth. Pressure on land, air, and water everywhere will double, and waste and pollution levels will soar.

No government is adequately prepared for these tasks—especially in the poorer developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where rapidly growing populations, poverty, and environmental degradation feed on one another. The poor, who are both victims and agents of environmental deterioration, press upon fragile lands, contributing to a cycle of deforestation, soil erosion, periodic flooding, loss of productivity, and further poverty. With few or no educational and health services, poor sanitation, and low status and meager opportunities for women, the populations of poor countries swell. Despite high infant and maternal mortality, the numbers of the poor will increase and feed migration to the cities, where life is only

marginally better and where people face a new set of environmental problems—water and air pollution of debilitating intensity. Some developing countries have broken the cycle. South Korea and China represent two different models for development: they have produced stunning economic growth and reduced poverty and fertility rates, but both are paying dearly in pollution and resource degradation.

The population of the former communist countries is likely to increase only slightly by 2025. In the same period the highly industrialized countries will increase from 1.2 billion to 1.4 billion, and most of that growth will be in the United States. Without immigration, the United States is growing at the rate of 0.7 percent annually, compared with 0.2 percent for Europe and 0.38 percent for Japan. Each year the United States adds 2 million people in births over deaths, plus another million through immigration. This is the equivalent of adding another California every 10 years. And alone among all the highly industrialized countries, the United States has seen its fertility rate rise in the 1990s to two children per woman, after hovering between 1.7 and 1.8 for 17 years.

In the United States, a 1 percent population growth rate means adding almost 3 million people to the population each year. It means further suburban sprawl, longer commutes to work, more pollution, and fewer open spaces. Even though these are real problems, few Americans perceive population growth as a domestic issue. Indeed, only when the differing rates at which societies consume materials and energy are taken into account, and when the relative impacts on the environment of different levels of development, wealth, and technology are calculated, does the seriousness of population growth become clear.

. . . AND CONSUMPTION NORTH AND SOUTH

Relative rates of resource consumption have become an issue internationally only since the North-South negotiations that led to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 at the "Earth Summit." The 180 nations represented at the conference signed a declaration and work plan that acknowledged the links between economic growth and environmental protection and the need for sustainable development. The OECD countries insisted that population growth be addressed, while developing countries charged that the North's extraordinary per capita consumption of energy and natural

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[2]Population figures are drawn from *The State of the World's Population, 1995* (New York: United Nations Population Fund, 1995) and World Resources Institute, *World Resources, 1994-1995* and *1996-1997* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994 and 1996).

resources—including many from the South—drives global environmental problems. As a result, both population and consumption concerns found their way into Agenda 21, the conference's blueprint for a sustainable world.

After UNCED, consumption was examined in relation to resource depletion, environmental degradation, and such global environmental problems as atmospheric warming, destruction of the ozone layer, fisheries depletion, and biodiversity loss. The postconference studies have made it clear that the environmental effects of population growth and increasing consumption rates can be tempered by technological improvements that make production, distribution, and disposal more efficient, by incentives to invest and trade, and by taxes and regulations. Examples include reduction of subsidies to resource-hungry industries and tax revisions that make polluters pay and provide incentives for more efficient resource use. Tools such as these are gaining acceptance as countries begin fulfilling their UNCED commitments, though not as rapidly as population is growing or certain resources deteriorating.

Current income and consumption disparities stem from a long history of economic domination of Africa, Asia, and Latin America by Europe, the United States, and Japan. Today there is a great divide, based on purchasing-power parity, between the average per capita GDP of the OECD countries ($18,988 in 1991) and that of the developing countries ($2,377).[3] These averages, of course, mask even wider disparities when the rich countries are compared with the poorest ones and declining commodity prices are taken into account. Hope of quickly closing the gap is dim, since the new technologies promising greater efficiency and substitutes for scarce materials are owned mostly by northern enterprises.

The rich and the poor take their toll on the environment in different ways: the rich through their high per capita consumption and production of wastes, and the poor through their pressure on fragile lands. In most poor countries a growing upper class consumes on a level comparable to that of citizens of the OECD countries. While the OECD countries have had the greater impact—contributing mightily to global warming and destruction of the ozone layer with their heavy use of fossil fuels and chemicals—the developing countries' production of food and fiber, mining and processing, and disposal of wastes have had mostly local impacts on soils, forests, biodiversity, and water.

Thirty years ago, environmentalists such as the authors of *Limits to Growth*, were mainly worried about the depletion of nonrenewable resources (fossil fuels, metals, and other minerals). Technology has since decreased dependence on natural resources by providing new materials and making the use of resources more efficient. Today it is clear that it is the so-called renewable resources—soil, forests, fisheries, biological diversity, air, and water—that human society is despoiling and using at unsustainable rates. In the worst cases, the depletion of the resource base may exceed its ability to regenerate, perhaps leading to ecosystem collapse.

Consumption, according to the President's Council on Sustainable Development (PCSD), which was organized in 1993, includes the "end-products, their ingredients and by-products, and all wastes generated throughout the life of a product, from raw materials extraction through disposal. It also means resource use by all kinds of consumers—industries, commercial firms, governments, nongovernmental organizations and individuals." Not surprisingly, consumption rates differ starkly between the industrialized and developing countries.

The 20 percent of the world's population that lives in the highly industrialized countries consumes an inordinate share of the world's resources: 80 percent of its paper, iron, and steel; 75 percent of its timber and energy; 60 percent of its meat, fertilizer, and cement; and half of its fish and grain. Per capita consumption comparisons are even more dramatic: in the OECD nations, each person uses 20 times as much aluminum and 17 times as much copper as a person in the developing countries. As for fossil fuels, so central to development and key to global warming, the industrialized countries use almost 50 percent of the total, which is nine times the average per capita consumption in the developing countries. Historically, the highly industrialized countries are responsible for as much as 75 percent of total world consumption, but the developing countries' share of consumption of most materials and energy is slowly rising and will continue to do so.[4]

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[3]Purchasing power parity is a GDP estimate based on the purchasing power of currencies rather than current exchange rates.

[4]Consumption figures are drawn from *World Resources, 1994-95*, chapters 2, 15, and 16, op. cit.; and "Population and Consumption: Report of a Task Force of the President's Council on Sustainable Development" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), chapter 2. Both volumes provide a wide range of additional sources.

The United States, with the world's largest economy, is also the largest consumer of natural resources and the largest producer of wastes. In the last 20 years, personal consumption of goods and services in the United States has risen 45 percent. The country is an especially heavy user of plastics and petroleum feedstocks, synthetic fabrics, aluminum and copper, potash, and gravel and cement. With a few exceptions, most notably oil, 70 percent of the minerals the United States uses are produced domestically, so the primary environmental consequences of production, transportation, and use are also felt there. The United States, with barely 5 percent of the world's population, is the leading contributor of greenhouse gases (about 19 percent) and probably the largest producer of toxic wastes. Although per capita consumption in the United States of most materials is decreasing slightly (the exceptions are paper and plastics), overall consumption continues to rise as population grows. For example, per capita energy consumption declined between 1980 and 1993, but total consumption rose 10 percent with the addition of 32 million to the population.

IMPLEMENTING SUSTAINABILITY

Although it is not politically popular to admit it, American patterns of production and consumption—admired and imitated by most of the world—are not sustainable. The environmental effects of high natural resources consumption will be multiplied as the developing countries' economic development requires an increasing share of the earth's largesse. And larger populations in both the industrialized and developing worlds constitute another formidable multiplier. The world faces a dilemma—poor countries need to "grow" out of poverty, just as the United States and Europe and Japan seek to "grow" their economies to provide jobs and services expected by the citizenry.

But growth on the American model, or even on that of the more materials-efficient European and Japanese economies, cannot alone forestall an environmental day of reckoning. Remaining tropical forests and all the diversity they house are disappearing at an annual rate of 0.9 percent—equivalent to the loss of a territory the size of the state of Washington annually. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, all 17 major ocean fisheries have reached or exceeded their limits, mainly from overfishing, and 9 are in serious

> *[G]rowth on the American model. . . cannot alone forestall an environmental day of reckoning.*

decline. Stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases will require as much as a 60 percent reduction in emissions worldwide. Current emission levels, even without the growth required in energy use in developing countries, will result in a doubling and eventually a quadrupling of greenhouse gases—bringing long-term global warming, changes in precipitation, and sea-level rise.

If a new kind of security threat is to be avoided and these trends diverted, then a more sustainable model of development is clearly required. As was noted earlier, in 1992 at UNCED, nations from around the world produced Agenda 21, their blueprint for sustainable development. Although loaded with political compromises, the 294-page document is instructive in its detail and comprehensiveness. It includes chapters on energy and marine management, as well as on the status of women and the role of nongovernmental organizations in development. By 1996 the President's Council on Sustainable Development had made international and intergenerational equity part of America's definition of sustainable activity—an activity "that can be continued indefinitely without harming the environmental, economic, or social basis on which it depends and without diminishing the opportunities of future generations to enjoy the resources and a quality of life at least equal to our own."

Sustainable development, by definition, means that each nation has to work out its own plan for economically and environmentally sensible development. Among the highly industrialized nations, the Netherlands has moved with greatest determination, ordering a radical reduction of toxic agricultural chemicals and negotiating long-term agreements between major industries and government that set ambitious goals for improving energy efficiency. By setting an example at home, and promoting sustainable development in its bilateral aid program, the Dutch have exerted leadership both in the European Union and in worldwide environmental negotiations that is extraordinary for so small a country.

Not all countries waited for UNCED before tackling their unsustainable development practices. Brazil, in the late 1980s, reversed the policies that had encouraged cattle ranching over tropical forest protection. And the Philippines halted logging subsidies that had encouraged transforming steep uplands from forest to farmland, with all the attendant problems. The transition to sustainable development is as difficult

in developing countries as anywhere else, as entrenched political elites defend the old models of development that have benefited them. Further changes in the developing countries will depend largely on the policies and practices of the international financial institutions—the World Bank and the IMF—which so far have been reluctant partners in the push for sustainable development.

Equally important is the example set by the highly industrialized countries, which must demonstrate that the transition to sustainable development is technically feasible, affordable, and politically possible. The United States, as the largest economic power, consumer, and polluter, is the key country that skeptics are watching. At present the United States is at a difficult point of transition. The nation has taken many steps to control pollution and degradation over the last 25 years, but few politicians are willing seriously to challenge such sacred cows as America's national addiction to the automobile, its extensive subsidies of water and energy, and its unsustainable harvest of public forests and catch from the seas.

The United States does, however, have many tools and experience in using them. In the early 1980s, state and federal legislation stemmed the loss of coastal wetlands, in part by cutting off construction and insurance subsidies for more than 150 undeveloped barrier islands. States like Florida, faced with a huge influx of retirees and tourists in the 1970s and 1980s, enacted land-use management to control development. Along with the federal government and private conservation organizations, states have also purchased sensitive and wilderness areas to protect them from development. The Clean Air Act provided the incentives for rapidly developing such pollution-control technologies as scrubbers, cleaner coal, and fluidized-bed combustion—advances that the energy industry had claimed would be difficult and costly when the legislation was first proposed.

Prices can also trigger technological improvement. The 1970s oil crisis, precipitated by price hikes by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, led to major savings in fuel costs when airlines invested in more efficient engines. Banning harmful materials—phosphates from detergents, asbestos, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)—has also been achieved at both the national and international levels, despite strong opposition from affected industries.

Unlike in some European countries, fiscal measures have not been effectively used in the United States to restrain the use of private automobiles and subsidize public transport. The only serious gasoline tax proposals ever made in the United States were quickly shot down in 1993, although modest measures such as taxes on petroleum and mineral extraction, recycling incentives, and user fees for waste disposal have been employed at state and local levels for conservation purposes.

POLICIES FOR CHANGE

It is clear that the poorer developing countries need steady international assistance and incentives to reduce population growth and to shift to more sustainable models of development. Exhorting these countries to pursue such difficult changes will have little effect until they perceive that the OECD nations are practicing what they preach. The United States in particular must provide such an example.

The task force on population and consumption of the President's Council on Sustainable Development has proposed a mix of tools for curbing population growth and consumption in the United States. To reduce population growth, the task force recommends focusing on family planning (specifically on avoiding unintended pregnancies and reducing teen pregnancy) and on immigration. Based on experience in both the United States and other countries that shows reproductive services work best in combination with an attack on related socioeconomic conditions, the task force recommended policies that would reduce poverty and discrimination and improve economic opportunities, especially for poor women. Similarly, the council's recommendations on immigration emphasize not just law enforcement, but also the need to help address, through foreign assistance and trade policies, the conditions in poor countries that give rise to emigration.

A second cluster of PCSD recommendations would help individuals exercise consumer choice—through environmental education and the certification and labeling of products—and also support the reduction of wastes. Public policies to reduce, reuse, and recycle are necessary, as are volume-based garbage fees that produce incentives and practical arrangements for the disposal of household toxic materials. In each case, the role of federal, state, and local governments in procuring and disposing of their own wastes is pivotal. The leverage that governments collectively wield as consumers of goods and services could provide the necessary momentum for fundamental changes in how the whole nation consumes and disposes of goods.

A third set of PCSD recommendations goes right to the heart of economic development interests in the United States. They are the most important to sustainable development and the most difficult to achieve. These prescriptions would affect resource use by eliminating government subsidies to a wide variety of industries and sectors that have come to expect them, and by shifting taxes from labor and investments to consumption—especially consumption of natural resources, virgin materials, and goods and services that harm the environment. Taxpayers are understandably nervous about how such fundamental shifts would personally affect them. Proposals therefore include provisions for "tax neutrality," with new consumption taxes offset by reductions in payroll taxes. Such a basic change in America's national tax system will not come easily or quickly, but state experiments such as promising legislation now in the Minnesota state legislature, backed by an unusual coalition of organizations of taxpayers and conservationists, may demonstrate the way to national legislation.

Although each of these recommendations would save money for government agencies and make United States producers more competitive in world markets, there are real up front costs for all change. Environmentalists and family-planning advocates

argue convincingly that the cost of not making these changes would be much higher, and would compound the problems facing the next generation. Some political leaders are thinking along these lines, but advocacy of belt tightening does not get politicians elected, so the campaign to change economic incentives will have to be couched in terms of efficiency, economy, and higher productivity.

In the past, policymakers in the United States have often been jolted into action by catastrophes. Severe drought-driven crop failure in the southeast in 1988 riveted Congress's attention for the first time on the dangers of global warming, even though the drought could not be directly attributed to it. Hurricanes and the 1993 flooding of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers revived the national debate on limits on federal disaster insurance. The United States can count on more such crises—a major crop failure, disease, or destruction associated with the weather, or an unmanageable threat to petroleum supplies from abroad—that will crank up the legislative and policy machinery and provide the impetus for a national shift to sustainable development. But American political leaders could also act before avoidable tragedy strikes again and could govern with the ecological and environmental security of future generations in mind. ∎

> Throughout the world, religious leaders are creating "a synthesis between religion and secular nationalism, providing a merger between the cultural identity and legitimacy of old religiously sanctioned monarchies and the democratic spirit and organizational unity of modern industrial society. . . We may be witnessing an unusual moment in history in which an accommodation to some aspects of religious nationalism will be necessary to achieve international security and domestic peace."

Religious Nationalism: A Global Threat?

Mark Juergensmeyer

When Jerusalem exploded in violence in September, it rekindled public memories of similar events in previous years: the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the bombing of the World Trade Center and the Oklahoma City federal building, the nerve gas assault on the Tokyo subway, bombs placed on Paris subways, and car bombings in New Delhi, Bombay, and Karachi. Earlier this year, when a truckload of explosives leveled an American military apartment building in Saudi Arabia, the fingers of suspicion pointed to Islamic activists, and for good reason: there has been a religious connection to virtually every other case of public violence in recent years.

Clearly, the rise of religious nationalism around the world has created a threat to global security. By fueling terrorist assaults, supporters of religious nationalist movements have toppled political regimes, altered the outcomes of elections, strained relations between nations, and made the world dangerous for international travel. In the long run, however, the question is whether nations that adopt a religious basis for political order will be able to coexist peacefully within the family of nations.

If the answer to this question is "no," if we in the West cannot live with religious nationalism, then the twenty-first century may witness a new global confrontation. We may have to contend with the

"clash of civilizations" that Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington raises as a real, if unhappy, outcome of the present realignment of political cultures. If the answer is "yes," it indicates an expectation that religious politics can be made compatible with the United Nations' standards of tolerance and human rights. Either way—to reject religious nationalists or to live with them—we have to try to understand them. This means asking where they came from, why they are so strident, and what they want.

THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM

Religious nationalists are a diverse lot: Islamic and Christian, socialist and capitalist, violent, and pacifist. What they have in common is what they oppose. They have risen in this moment of modern history as a negative response to the central tenets of modernism that have guided Western society since the time of the Enlightenment: the ideas of secular law, intellectual skepticism, and individual moral choice.

One of the reasons why secular ideas and institutions are so firmly rejected, especially in non-Western countries, is that they are held accountable for society's moral decline. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, for example, was incensed over what he and others referred to as "West-toxification." The goal of the Islamic revolution in Iran, from his point of view, was not only to free Iranians politically from the shah but also to liberate them conceptually from Western ways of thinking.

The ties between Western powers and present-day secular nationalists such as Algeria's leaders,

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Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, and the Palestinian Authority's Yasir Arafat, are suspect not only because the secular West is seen as the global enemy of religion. For some religious nationalists, America has orchestrated a worldwide conspiracy against religion, and virtually anything the United States does that involves non-Western societies—even when its intentions are positive—is suspect. In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, for example, Islamic activists found themselves in the odd position of defending a secular socialist leader, Saddam Hussein, against what they perceived to be an anti-Islamic of the United States in sending in thousands of troops to defend Kuwait.

SATANIZING THE ENEMY

The most extreme form of this way of thinking is "satanization." During the early days of the Gulf War, Hamas, the Islamic fundamentalist Palestinian movement, issued a communiqué stating that the United States "commands all the forces hostile to Islam and the Muslims." In Iran during the early stages of the revolution, both the shah and President Jimmy Carter were referred to as *yazid* (in this context an "agent of satan"). The ayatollah had determined that "all the problems of Iran" were the work of "the Great Satan," the United States. As these statements indicate, this line of reasoning often leads down a slippery slope, for once secular institutions and authorities begin to loom larger than life and take on a satanic luster, it follows that secular enemies are more than mortal foes: they are dehumanized mythic entities and satanic forces.

Those members of formerly colonized countries whose expectations for secular nationalism had been great also experienced a major disappointment in its failure. The disdain for secular nationalism has been linked to a perception that secular institutions have failed to perform: they have failed their own promises of political freedom, economic prosperity, and social justice.

Some of the most poignant cases of disenchantment with secularism have been found among educated members of the middle class, who were raised with the high expectations propagated by secular nationalist political leaders, and who have now been propelled toward religious nationalism. In Egypt, for example, even moderate professionals have joined groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, proclaiming that their country's experiment with secular nationalism has been "an economic, social, and moral failure."

Ultimately secular nationalism is perceived by many as having failed not only because its institutions and leaders have disappointed them, but also because they have ceased to believe in it. They have lost faith in secularism itself. Secular nationalism is seen as an alien thing, at best the expression of only a privileged few. As both capitalist and formerly socialist governments wrestle with their own constituencies over the moral purpose of their nations and the directions they are to take, their old, tired forms of nationalism seem less appealing elsewhere.

As a result, the last decades of this century have witnessed a proliferation of new movements for religious nationalism. Only in Iran, however, has religious nationalism gained so much control, although Sudan, with the Islamic leadership of Hassan Turabi, has become for all practical purposes an Islamic state. The 1992 Algerian elections might have brought an Islamic regime to power, but a military coup forestalled that possibility. It also initiated a Muslim guerrilla war against the secular state that has led to bombings and political assassinations at home, and subway attacks in Paris, where the French government is viewed as supporting the crackdown against the Islamic party.

In the Middle East, Jewish extremists such as Dr. Baruch Goldstein, who killed more than 30 Muslims in the Shrine of the Patriarchs in 1994, and Yigal Amir, who assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin last year, have altered the course of Israeli politics. So have violent members of Hamas. While waging war against Israel they are simultaneously sparring with Yasir Arafat; often the attacks leveled at Israelis are intended to wound the credibility of Arafat's fledgling Palestinian government. In Egypt, Islamic militants associated with the Islamic Group have attacked not only Egyptian politicians—killing President Anwar Sadat and attempting to kill his successor, Hosni Mubarak—but also foreigners. The movement literally moved its war against secular powers abroad, to the United States, where its leader, Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, became involved in the 1993 bombing attack on New York City's World Trade Center. The trial that led to his conviction in January 1996 also implicated him in an elaborate plot to blow up a variety of sites in the New York City area, including the United Nations buildings and the Lincoln Tunnel.

Religious nationalists have made their presence felt in such nominally Muslim countries as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey, where Islamic revolutionaries have identified their own moderate Muslim leaders as obstacles to progress. In the United States it appears that passionate hatred of secular government led to the bombing of the federal build-

ing in Oklahoma City, and the vision of a Christian nation has motivated both members of Christian militia and radical anti-abortion activists. In India, widespread disdain for secular politics has made the. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) the largest movement for religious nationalism in the world. At the other extreme from these significant political movements are peripheral but potent groups such as Japan's notorious Aum Shinrikyo, which is accused of releasing deadly nerve gas in Tokyo subways in 1995. The groups holds an apocalyptic vision of world government to be ruled by religious powers after a colossal global war.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM

In parts of the world where movements of religious nationalism threaten to gain political power—especially India, Egypt, Algeria, and the Palestinian territories—as well as areas such as Iran and Sudan where they already are in control, minority communities have watched the rising tide of religious nationalism with great apprehension. Their misgivings, often exacerbated by the outspoken anxieties of old secular leaders, center around the concern that a state supported by religious nationalism will favor the majority religious community at the expense of the minorities, whether religious, ethnic, or secular.

This apprehension is warranted, for at the very least religious nationalists want the symbols and culture of their own religious communities glorified as part of the heritage of the nation. What concerns minorities more than flags and slogans, however, are two more problematic possibilities: the potential for preferential treatment for the majority community members in government hiring and policies, and the possibility that the minorities will be required to submit to religious laws that they do not respect. Beyond this is a third, more apocalyptic, fear: that they will eventually be driven away from their own homelands or persecuted or killed if they remain.

These fears raise the question of how religious nationalists would deal with the issue of minority rights when a religious state is established. Thoughtful religious nationalists have considered this question and have proposed two solutions. One is to provide separate status (or even a separate state) for minority communities, as Israel has for the Palestinians. The other solution is to accommodate the communities into the prevailing ideology—primarily by regarding the dominant religious ideology as a general cultural phenomenon to which a variety of religious communities are heir.

This is the approach of the BJP in India. The party claims all of Indian tradition to be Hindu tradition—including Sikhism, Buddhism, and Jainism—and allows for the religions from outside India, such as Christianity and Islam, to be affiliated with Hinduism as syncretic Christian-Hindu and Muslim-Hindu branches.

The first solution—separate status—is problematic, especially if it requires finding an appropriate status or place for the minority groups. The Palestinian solution has not pleased many Jewish activists, whose theology of religious nationalism is connected with biblical locations, many of which are on the West Bank of the Jordan River that is to be governed by the Palestinian Authority. Hindu nationalists in India reject the claims of Sikh and Kashmiri separatists since they assert that India is culturally whole. There is not much room in these positions to grant separate territory to minority communities. In such cases the British government's solution earlier in this century in colonial India might have an appeal: it set up "reserved constituencies" to guarantee that minority communities would have a certain percentage of representatives in parliament.

The second solution—accommodation of cultural differences—also has its problems, but provides a more flexible range of options. One of the more promising is an idea that I first heard discussed by Muslim activists in Egypt, and then again in an entirely different context, among Muslim leaders in Gaza. These leaders insisted that Egyptian and Palestinian nationalists should subscribe to sharia, or Islamic law, but they indicated that there are two kinds of sharia: at a general cultural level there are general social mores that are incumbent on all residents of the nation, regardless of their religious affiliations, and at a particular level are the detailed personal and family codes of behavior required only of Muslims. This formulation is similar, they said, to patterns they had experienced while traveling abroad. When in England or America they were expected to obey the laws and standards of Western civilization in public, but privately followed Muslim, rather than Western, customs.

In India, where the BJP makes a distinction between "Hindutva"—traditional Hindu values—and the religion Hinduism, and Iran, where leaders have given separate status to a limited number of minorities, there is reason to hope that something akin to the "two-tiered sharia" solution might work. The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran guarantees "equal rights" not only to every "ethnic group

or tribe," but to "Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians" as "recognized minorities." Some groups, such as Baha'is, however, are regarded as heretical Muslims rather than genuine minorities and have only two options: to revert to the true faith or leave. Those that have done neither have been persecuted.

In Egypt, where the Coptic Christian community is the major minority, some Muslim leaders have suggested that the Copts be allowed their own representatives in parliament. If they were, these leaders told me, the Copts would be "better off" than they are under the secular government, which, since it does not recognize religious differences, does not provide political concessions for religious minorities. The Copts themselves continue to be suspicious of this accommodationist rhetoric.

In Israel, although the peace process under way provides an accommodation to a secular Palestinian authority, it is unlikely that Israeli leaders will be hospitable to a stridently Muslim Palestine: they tolerate Muslim nationalists even less than Jewish ones. Jewish nationalists, incidentally, have no problem with the idea of Muslim nationalism, as long as it is not practiced in Israel—especially the wider Eretz Israel described in the Bible, which includes most of the West Bank. For that reason, the most extreme Jewish nationalists in Israel call for a direct solution to "the Arab problem:" the Arabs should leave.

THE NEW SEPARATISM

Separation is a solution that is increasingly accepted throughout the world, however, as large, unwieldy nations have fragmented into federations of smaller, more ethnically homogenous ones. The idea that India might break into smaller units was unthinkable during the Nehru era, when large national units such as the United States and the Soviet Union were the models for modern nation-states. Now that the Soviet Union itself has broken into smaller, ethnic-based entities, the fissiparous ethnic tendencies of the Sikhs and other groups in India do not seem so ominous. The separatist solution works best when the minority communities reside in a distinct region that can be given a measure of autonomy in a federal state. When the minorities are dispersed throughout society—like the Copts in Egypt, and Muslims in India—the accommodation approach is more viable.

Could the accommodation approach work with

secular minorities? Even in traditional religious cultures there are people who were raised in religious households but who, through travel, education, or association with modern urban culture, have lost interest in religion. Should there not be a safe cultural haven for such people in a religious society, just as the cultures of Copts and other minorities are maintained as islands in seas of religiosity?

Most religious nationalists to whom I posed the question answered with a resounding "no." They could accept the idea that other religious traditions contain valid alternatives to their own religious law, but not secular culture: it had, in their eyes, no links with a higher truth. From their point of view, it was simply antireligion. Some religious nationalists found it difficult to accept secularism even in Europe and America where, they felt, Christianity was unable to maintain the moral compass of society. Still, the logic of the "two-tiered sharia" admits at least the possibility of islands of secular culture within a religious state.

CAN WE LIVE WITH RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM?

While it is understandable why many activists have turned to ideologies of religious nationalism at this point in history, it is not so clear what, if anything, we can or should do about it. Perhaps the West's first task is coming to terms with the phenomenon itself, and accepting the fact that religious nationalism, in one form or another, is here to stay. As one United States State Department official put it, "We have to be smarter in dealing with Islam than we were in dealing with communism 30 or 40 years ago." If the West accepts that challenge, its next problem is sorting out which aspects of religious nationalism it should continue adamantly to oppose, and which aspects it can tolerate.

If Westerners were to compile a list of what in religious nationalism they cannot live with, and another of what they can tolerate, the first list might be quite lengthy. This list of what they must reject would surely include the potential to foment demagoguery and dictatorship, the tendency to satanize the United States and to loathe Western civilization, and the potential to become violent and intolerant. Fortunately, many religious nationalists themselves claim that these are not essential to their ideology, and they decry them. For that reason, the most effective ways of countering them may come from within the reli-

> *As one United States State Department official put it, "We have to be smarter in dealing with Islam than we were in dealing with communism 30 or 40 years ago."*

gious communities themselves: from the critiques of pious Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and other religious nationalists who are embarrassed by the negative misuse of their positions. Extreme forms of ethnoreligious dominance—like the genocide attempted in Bosnia—will require international intervention.

The other list—aspects of religious nationalism that the West can live with—includes potentially more significant and enduring matters. Such a list might begin with religious nationalists' appreciation of tradition and history, and their insistence on grounding public institutions in morality. The utopian element of Western political theory—the notion that national societies are moral communities established for the common good—has often been slighted in the rush toward progress and in the details of democratic procedure. For that reason there may be some aspects of the religious nationalists' agenda that Westerners can not only live with, but also admire. They may remind the West of an ethical dimension in its own political tradition that needs to be revived.

In between these two lists is a third one: aspects of religious nationalism that the West may find uncomfortable, but with which it might have to learn to coexist. These are basic and persistent differences between the Western way of looking at nationalism and theirs, and these will continue to be sources of friction in the future. One is the religious nationalists' insistence on divine justifications for human laws and democratic institutions. A second is the assumption that certain lands are the province of only one religion. A third is the religious nationalists' exaltation of communitarian values over individual ones. America virtually worships its individualists—the cowboy and the lone adventurer—but the notion of individualism runs counter to the very logic of religious nationalism: that a nation should reflect the collective values of the moral community that constitutes it.

These differences are deep and abiding, and they indicate that although there can be a certain synthesis between the ideology of religious nationalism and the structure of the nation-state, there can ultimately be no true convergence between religious and secular political ideologies. Over time, however, there might develop a grudging respect between the two, and the possibility of mutual coexistence. Each might be able to admire what the other provides: communitarian values and moral vision on the one hand, individualism and rational rules of justice on the other. After all, both are responses to, and products of, the modern age. To what extent this mutu-

ality of respect will grow depends on whether religious nationalists continue to regard the secular West as an enemy, and whether the West continues to regard religious nationalists in the same way. The real question, then, is whether they—and the West—can change.

Because there is ultimately no satisfactory compromise on an ideological level between religious and secular nationalism, it is possible that the current situation will deteriorate still further. As the economic and political crises deepen in various parts of the world, one can imagine the emergence of a united religious bloc stretching from Central and South Asia through the Middle East to Africa. With an arsenal of nuclear weapons at its disposal, it could very well replace the old Soviet Union as the global enemy of the secular West. Such a conflict would be compounded if a new wave of religious radicals arose in Europe and America, including fundamentalist Christians and members of newly immigrant communities of Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs living in England and the United States who support their religious comrades at home. Nascent cults of cultural nationalists in Japan and elsewhere in the Far East might also be in league with what could become the West's new foe.

Barring this apocalyptic vision of a worldwide "clash of civilizations," we have reason to be hopeful. It is equally as likely that religious nationalists are incapable of uniting with one another, and that they will greatly desire an economic and political reconciliation with the secular world.

In Iran, India, Iran, Afghanistan, Egypt, Algeria, Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and other regions where new models of religious nationalism are being fashioned, leaders are doing far more than resuscitating archaic ideas of religious rule. They are actually creating something new: a synthesis between the ideology of religion and the institution of secular democracy, providing a merger between the cultural identity and legitimacy of old religiously sanctioned monarchies and the democratic spirit and organizational unity of modern industrial society. This combination can be incendiary, for it blends the absolutism of religion with the potency of the modern state. Yet perhaps it is inevitable, for without the legitimacy conferred by religion, public order in some parts of the world cannot be easily maintained. We may be witnessing an unusual moment in history in which an accommodation to some aspects of religious nationalism will be necessary to achieve international security and domestic peace. ■

The global economy is central to understanding the human dimensions of international security. One of the most important aspects of globalization—the flow of investment capital and the business and state interactions that guide this flow—is examined here, where it is argued that "the increased mobility of foreign direct investment and multinational corporations is imposing real and increasingly severe constraints on workers, communities, and states."

Winners and Losers in the Global Economics Game

GERALD EPSTEIN, JAMES CROTTY, AND PATRICIA KELLY

Is globalization "a bunch of globaloney," as some have suggested? Or is it a significant phenomenon, one that hurts workers and communities while dramatically reducing a nation's ability to pursue independent policies? If the latter, what, if anything, can be done to control this process and create a framework for viable progressive policies?

Here we look at one aspect of globalization: the role of multinational corporations and foreign direct investment.[1] How might MNCs and FDI affect our standard of living in the long run? In discussing this question, we identify five views of the effect these phenomena might have on the trajectory of the world economy.

The first view is "the race to the bottom." Over 15 years ago, two widely read books, *The New International Division of Labor* and *Global Reach,* claimed

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[1]Foreign direct investment refers to an equity investment outside a parent corporation's home country that implies some control by the parent corporation over economic activity, usually a greater than 10 percent stake. Multinational corporations generally refer to companies that have significant economic operations in more than one country. FDI and MNCs will be used interchangeably despite the fact that multinational corporations undertake significant economic activities outside their home countries independent of foreign direct investment, especially licensing and outsourcing activities.

[2]Folker Froble, J. Heinrichs, and O. Kreye, *The New International Division of Labor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Richard Barnet and Ronald E. Mueller, *Global Reach* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975).

that multinational corporate mobility had reached extreme levels.[2] These books gave life to the view of stateless corporations roaming the globe, reconfiguring capital and communities beyond the reach of any government. According to this perspective, capital will increasingly be able to play workers, communities, and nations off one another as it demands tax, regulatory, and wage concessions while threatening to move. The increased mobility of MNCs benefits capital while workers and communities lose. A modified version of this view is that the winners in the race to the bottom will include highly educated (or skilled) workers, or workers in particular professions (for example, lawyers), along with the capitalists.

The second view, "the climb to the top," suggests that multinational corporations are attracted less by low wages and taxes than by highly educated workers, good infrastructure, high levels of demand, and synergistic effects arising from the existence of other companies that have already located in a particular place. Competition for foreign direct investment will lead countries in the North and the South to try to provide well-educated labor and high-quality infrastructure. Thus "footloose" capital and competition, far from creating a race to the bottom, will instead induce a climb to the top around the world.

This "climb to the top" could lead to the outcome represented by the third view: "neoliberal convergence." This is the mainstream view that the mobility of multinational corporations, made possible by deregulation and free trade, will produce increased living standards in all countries. This process will, moreover, transfer capital and technology

abroad, thereby raising the standard of living in the poorer countries at a faster rate than in the wealthier ones, eventually generating a worldwide convergence in living standards.

These same processes could, however, lead to the outcome envisaged in the fourth view, "uneven development." This view holds that one region of the world grows at the expense of another. The idea of uneven development has a long and, now, ironic history: for decades the dominant version of this view was the theory of imperialism, which held that if the South integrated with the North, the North would grow at the expense of the South. Today the fear seems to be the opposite: by having to compete with cheap southern labor, an integrated world economy will help the South grow, but this time at the expense of the North.

Two of these views, race to the bottom and uneven development, hold that FDI and MNCs are significant causes of unemployment, inequality, and wage stagnation in the North. The other two, climb to the top and neoliberal convergence, hold that MNCs and FDI and other aspects of global integration actually ought to be helping the North and South to grow, and that problems such as increases in economic inequality and unemployment in the industrialized countries are caused by other factors, the most important of which is rapid technological change.

We have not mentioned the fifth and most popular view: "much ado about nothing." The other views differ greatly but have at least one thing in common: a conviction that FDI and MNCs have a big impact. "Much ado about nothing" indicates that FDI and MNCs play a much more modest role than the others suggest. Adherents argue that:

1. International economic integration is currently not much greater than it was at the turn of the century;

2. FDI is still a relatively small percentage of gross domestic products;

3. Most FDI is between the rich countries and therefore can generate neither convergence nor a race to the bottom;

4. Of the FDI that does go to the developing countries, most flows to a handful of nations, with 80 percent of developing country FDI going to fewer than 10 countries;

5. Moreover, these few countries attract FDI on the basis of their large markets and modern infrastructure rather than cheap labor. Given these circumstances, the role of FDI for good or ill has been highly exaggerated.

INVESTMENT IN CONTEXT

Which of the five views is correct? To answer this, we would first argue that foreign direct investment is neither inherently good nor inherently bad. The effect of capital mobility on nations and communities fundamentally depends on the context within which it occurs. We will focus on three aspects of the overall context that we think are especially important in determining the impact of FDI and MNCs: aggregate demand (that is, total national expenditures); the nature of the domestic and international rules of the game and institutions governing investment; and the nature of domestic and international competition. We argue that these three factors decisively influence how FDI and MNCs affect the economy—especially wages, inequality, and the level of unemployment.

Foreign direct investment made in a context of high levels of aggregate demand and effective rules that limit the destructive aspects of competition may indeed have a positive impact on nations and communities. However, foreign investment made in a context of high unemployment and destructive economic and political competition in the absence of effective rules can have a significantly negative impact on both home and host countries.

This framework leads to the key observation that the same level of FDI can have different effects in different contexts. For example, contrast the effects on workers and communities of outward flows of FDI from the United States in the 1960s with their probable effects today. During the 1960s, outward FDI was at roughly the same level as it is today. In the high-employment, high-growth era of the 1960s, FDI was more likely to increase exports from domestic companies than act as a substitute for them. But even when FDI led to domestic plant shutdowns, replacement jobs were relatively easy for workers and communities to find. As a result, companies had much less bargaining power over workers and communities through threats of shutdown, which meant that companies had less leverage to bargain down wages and tax rates.

In the 1990s, with a shortage of high-paying jobs and critical state and local budget problems, workers and governments are much more subject to the bargaining power of companies when they threaten to move abroad. Jobs lost because of plant shutdowns are not easily replaced with jobs at similar wages and tax revenues. And companies are much more likely to substitute foreign production for domestic production, especially for the export market, when they move abroad.

We can now state a central hypothesis: we believe that in the current neoliberal economic regime, FDI and MNCs have more negative than positive effects. The neoliberal regime is composed of strong forces that lead to insufficient levels of aggregate demand and therefore chronic unemployment, coercive competition, and destructive domestic and international rules of the game—that is, precisely those factors that undermine the potentially positive effects of FDI. Some of the most important components include budgetary austerity, financial liberalization, privatization, increased labor market "flexibility," and trade and investment liberalization.

The negative impact of these processes is most evident in the United States. Highly advanced in its adoption of neoliberal precepts and facing serious aggregate demand constraints, it is both the biggest host to and source of FDI, and it faces enormous coordination problems among its state and local governments. In contrast, in Asia, where government controls have been relatively strong and aggregate demand high, the negative impact is currently much less in evidence. In Europe, where protective institutions may be even stronger than in Asia but where the outflows of FDI are greater, the story may be somewhere in between. The point, however, is that as the neoliberal regime widens, so may its negative impact. If Europe and Asia look to the United States in this regard, they may see their future.

Looking at MNCs and FDI within the neoliberal regime helps resolve several puzzling issues. First, it helps explain how the impact of FDI can be much larger than its sheer size would suggest. When corporations threaten to leave, they can win concessions from labor and tax subsidies from governments. This occurs even if they don't move. Such effects can spill over into the community, leading, for example, to lower tax revenues for services such as education.

Second, this framework helps explain why these problems are created even if FDI flows are primarily between the countries of the North rather than between the North and the South: it is the mobility and the threat of mobility that generate many of the problems, even if that mobility is between similar nations or even similar states or provinces. Workers and communities may be harmed even if a country such as the United States has both large inward and outward flows of FDI; the problem again is the possibly destructive impact of capital mobility

in a particular setting. Third, there may be a negative impact even if countries or locales do not (or indeed especially if they do not) receive any FDI. At the behest of promoters of neoliberal ideology, countries and locales may engage in destructive bidding and structural changes to attract FDI, yet may not receive much.

This shift in bargaining power and the destructive competition among nations and locales for capital suggests an important paradox. As we noted earlier, foreign direct investment is attracted by high aggregate demand, high-quality infrastructure, and a highly skilled workforce. Yet foreign direct investment and capital mobility within the neoliberal structure undermine those very factors that attract and sustain MNCs. Short-term capital mobility and austerity undercut demand, and destructive tax competition, wage stagnation, and unemployment constrain government and private investment in infrastructure and human capital. In short, countries will find it increasingly difficult to offer companies the demand, infrastructure, and skills that they need.

> *[M]ost developing nations remain nearly shut out of international financial markets.*

THE OTHER WAR BETWEEN THE STATES

The "War Between the States," as the competition among American states for investment and jobs has come to be called, may well be a microcosm of what could be emerging in the global arena as the neoliberal regime strengthens. As nations sign bilateral and multilateral investment agreements, as aggregate demand continues to stagnate, and as the ideology of attracting FDI as the engine of growth catches hold, global conditions may begin to look more like those found among the states. Of course, given national sovereignty, which is not going to go away, the international risks and enforcement problems for capital will be substantially greater than they are within the United States. But the same tendencies will hold.

In the United States, the increased mobility of capital across geographic regions has brought heightened competition between states to attract and retain corporate investment. This growing competition can be seen in the rush of deals offering multimillion-dollar tax breaks and incentives to large corporations in return for in-state investments, as well as in the proliferation of state tax credit programs for firms looking for new production sites. These corporate tax credits and other financial incentives result in billions of dollars in foregone state revenues each year. The fall

in corporate tax collections has put additional pressure on state governments, which have cut public services while struggling to balance budgets. Moreover, with the decline in revenues from corporate tax dollars has come a shifting of the tax burden onto individuals.

Competitive business incentive policies by the states have a natural propensity to expand. As one state institutes a new tax break or subsidy, other states feel compelled to expand their incentive packages; officials fear that otherwise their state would be left behind in the contest to hold onto existing jobs and channel increasingly mobile capital to their communities. The frantic competition between the states in effect rewards firms for relocating. The growth of incentives thus may even further encourage the capital mobility that has driven the proliferation of these competitive programs in the first place.

Ironically, past studies have shown that tax incentives have generally been either ineffective or relatively unimportant in determining the location decisions of firms. One study suggests that these kinds of state incentive programs have now become so widespread that they basically offset each other in attracting new investment. Thus, the last decade's proliferation of "beggar thy neighbor" incentive programs may not have actually generated any significant change in the distribution of production among states. For many states, the end result of corporate tax breaks and subsidies has likely been a "race to the bottom," with little gain in jobs, lower corporate tax revenues, and fewer public services and higher taxes for the public.

Similar problems may be appearing in other countries as the neoliberal regime spreads and deepens. In the South we confront the paradox that while many countries are making large and costly changes in their economies and government policies to attract FDI, most are receiving little. While direct investment flows have increased in recent years, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries continue to claim the lion's share of these flows: 80 percent between 1981 and 1990 and over 50 percent between 1990 and 1995. While these numbers do suggest an increase in flows to less developed countries, capital flows to the developing world are highly concentrated: 10 countries received 70 percent of the flows between 1980 and 1990, a trend that continued into the 1990s. Thus, most developing nations remain nearly shut out of international financial markets.

FACING THE NEOLIBERAL PARADOX

In this neoliberal environment, international investment coordination problems may well lead to a paradox: while MNCs are attracted to high levels of demand, infrastructure, and human capital, nations and communities are likely to be increasingly prevented from becoming strong in these areas as they engage in a race to the bottom in tax revenues and austerity measures. Many academics and policymakers, though they recognize the potential dangers of capital mobility in combination with technological change and freer trade, are reluctant to place significant constraints on a company's ability to move in and out of a country. Instead, some have called for more skills training and infrastructure investment to attract FDI. We doubt that this is the path that countries, working in decentralized fashion, will be able to follow without some significant changes in their economic and political structure.

A "climb to the top" requires expenditure on infrastructure and education, as well as companies that are committed enough to a locale to incur these costs for the long-term benefits they will yield. But a world of international tax competition and mobility may preclude this climb to the top option. Race to the bottom tactics give an advantage to some countries that are willing to move first to lower taxes. Governments may simply not be able to tax sufficiently to provide the resources necessary to implement the climb to the top option.

Are there policies that can restore the relative bargaining power of workers, communities, and nations and stop the race to the bottom, making the climb to the top more likely? Yes.

The following framework proposes policies that address the three central problems we have identified: insufficient aggregate demand, destructive practices and rules of the game, and coercive competition. We should note at the outset that a distinction must be made between levels of policy implementation as well as between the actors involved. In the first place, we can distinguish among local, national, regional, and international levels of policy implementation. We can also distinguish between actions taken primarily by governments and those taken by workers and citizens.

In making this latter distinction we recognize that a central problem in trying to devise policies to alter the bargaining power between the government and capital is that capital has in many instances become the government. In short, an essential difficulty in devising and implementing progressive policies is the relative lack of power

citizens have in determining government economic policy.

Restoring high levels of aggregate demand would help create an environment that would greatly reduce the negative impact of FDI. Of course, there is a chicken and egg aspect to resolving this problem, since FDI, by driving down wages and creating government budget problems, contributes to the aggregate demand deficiency. Standard policies to restore aggregate demand may not be sufficient to correct the bargaining and coordination problems created by FDI within the neoliberal regime. However, if national governments had the will, there is no shortage of feasible institutional mechanisms to coordinate policies to enhance aggregate demand. These could be implemented at the international level (coordinated by the IMF, for example), or by regional groups, such as the European Union.

To remedy the second problem of destructive practices and rules of the game, governments and communities should implement policies to foreclose the race to the bottom. Here action could be undertaken at the international, national, and regional levels in the North and the South.

First, there should be a moratorium on all international agreements promoted by international organizations or countries in the North to liberalize the laws that control FDI. This would include, for example, the comprehensive treaty to protect foreign direct investment currently being negotiated by the OECD, as well as negotiations for an investment treaty with the World Trade Organization (WTO). This moratorium should remain in place until an international set of rules to foreclose the race to the bottom option is put into place. Discussions within the WTO and OECD to further liberalize FDI should end unless they focus on mechanisms to foreclose the "low wage, high waste" option. The same holds true of current negotiations to extend NAFTA.

Second, international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF should stop pressuring developing and transitional countries to open their economies to FDI as a condition for receiving credit. This simply contributes to the wasteful competition we have described. And third, governments of home countries, including the United States, should stop investing so much diplomatic capital in encouraging countries like China to make it easier for MNCs to operate.

An international agreement forbidding unproductive tax competition should be implemented and enforced by an international organization like the WTO. Some international organizations are investigating voluntary agreements along these lines. Such agreements should also be implemented at regional and national levels.

For the third problem, separate measures to rein in coercive competition may not be required if there is expansionary aggregate demand policy, international tax competition treaties, and a moratorium on new investment agreements. However, in the event that there is not, measures to slow rapid structural change on the trade side may be required. In particular, policies that limit the rate of increase of imports over the medium term may be needed to slow the pace of structural change and allow companies and communities to adjust. Such interferences with trade ought to be used as a last resort, however, since trade between countries can be mutually beneficial.

A WAY FORWARD

The increased mobility of foreign direct investment and multinational corporations is imposing real and increasingly severe constraints on workers, communities, and states. But it is not the case that, as supporters of neoclassical economics or the globalization thesis argue, these constraints are an inevitable outcome of technological change or an irreversible juggernaut. On the contrary, the effect of FDI depends crucially on the domestic and international context within which it occurs. Different domestic and international contexts governing MNCs and FDI produce different outcomes. As we have shown, the growing neoliberal regime is increasingly creating real constraints on progressive economic policy. Moreover, within that regime, MNCs and FDI have increasingly negative impacts. But other regimes are possible; indeed, they coexist within the neoliberal regime. These regimes include policies to expand aggregate demand, to impose an international set of standards, and to raise domestic standards. Despite the increasing international constraints posed by capital mobility within the neoliberal regime, pessimism is not the order of the day. ∎

Trade Policy and Development: Spurring Good Growth

THEA M. LEE

The worldwide gap between the rich and the poor has become a vast chasm. Both within and between countries, the rich grow richer at the expense of the poor. From 1970 to 1985, global GNP increased by 40 percent, yet the number of poor increased by 17 percent. The poorest 20 percent of the world's people have seen their share of global income fall from 2.3 percent to 1.4 percent in the past 30 years, while the share of the richest 20 percent has risen from 70 percent to 85 percent. More than 1 billion people live in countries where average per capita income fell between 1980 and 1993. If the world continues down its current path, according to United Nations Development Program (UNDP) administrator Gustave Speth, "economic disparities between the industrial and developing nations will move from inequitable to inhuman."

Inequality is also on the rise in the developed world. Europe is experiencing chronic and high unemployment, while in the United States polarization between the wealthy and the rest of working America has increased: wages for the vast majority of the workforce have fallen or stagnated for the last 20 years, while after-tax corporate profit rates have hit a 30-year high.[1] Within developing countries the record is mixed, with progress toward reducing inequality mainly occurring in the fast-growing Asian countries. In most Eastern European and many Latin American countries, inequality is growing.

What can be done to halt this alarming trend? A change in United States and multilateral trade policies is a crucial first step. Current trade and investment policy enriches and empowers an international corporate elite, while forcing workers into a destructive, downward-spiraling competition and eroding environmental protection. As the world economy grows more interconnected, the laws governing international commerce must adapt to preserve and encourage national laws protecting workers and the environment. To this end, the United States should be working toward incorporating a social dimension into its trade agreements. This would involve providing improved transitional support for workers displaced by trade, as well as incorporating minimum standards for labor rights and environmental protection into future trade agreements. The United States needs to rethink the conditions for deeper trade relations it imposes on its trading partners, especially those in the developing world. And it needs to free itself from the notion that "free trade" is a goal in and of itself, rather than just another policy tool at its disposal.

This policy shift would serve several purposes, some symbolic and others substantive. On the symbolic front, it would serve notice to corporations that shifting production around the globe in order to weaken the bargaining power of workers or to evade legitimate and efficient environmental measures would no longer be encouraged and rewarded. Developing country governments would understand that global competition for scarce capi-

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[1] Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, and John Schumitt, The State of Working America, 1996-1997 (Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute, 1996).

tal would be won by those offering the best-educated workers, the most modern infrastructure, and the cleanest air and water—not the most disenfranchised workers and the most exploitable natural environment. These messages would be backed by financial measures: aid flows to implement higher standards and punitive tariffs on goods produced in violation of agreed standards. The point is not to reduce competition, but to channel it into constructive areas.

For too long most economists have focused obsessively on the efficiency gains associated with lower trade barriers while ignoring distributional concerns and transitional costs. If we take a broader perspective and recognize that the ultimate social goal is not necessarily larger trade volume, lower trade barriers, or even aggregate growth, we can weigh small efficiency gains against the social costs of a more regressive income distribution or transitional increases in poverty and unemployment. This is a very different social calculus. While new trade, aid, and investment policies cannot solve all the problems of failed development or radically redistribute income at home, they can at the very least point us in the right direction.

Of course, the developing countries themselves must choose the paths that best suit their needs, and ultimately the solutions to their problems will be in their hands. However, changes in United States and multilateral policies can help establish in the global economy the institutions and the framework to spur the right kinds of development and growth: equitable, sustainable, and democratic. Even small policy changes in these areas could have a disproportionately large impact. In many developing countries, fiscal and monetary policies, regulations, and social policy are influenced by the strings attached to the provision of aid, availability of concessionary loans, and eligibility for inclusion in trade agreements.

FREE TRADE FAILURES

In the last 15 years, the policymaking elite in Washington and its allies in the developing world have reached near-unanimous agreement on the package of policies that the first world should be fostering in the third world. This package, dubbed "the Washington consensus" by the Institute for International Economics' John Williamson, includes lower trade barriers, privatization of state-owned enterprises, deregulation, and fiscal austerity. A corollary to the Washington consensus, at least in terms of practical policy applications, has been the reduction of aid flows from the industrialized to the developing countries, and a decrease in concessionary treatment in trade agreements for developing countries. Debt relief has been minimal, confined mainly to converting short-term debt into long-term debt. At the same time, the business community has fought attempts by developing countries to regulate foreign investment and has worked for improved protection for intellectual property claims (that is, copyrights and patents). Unfortunately, the blanket implementation of one part of this consensus—what is generally called "free trade"—has failed to deliver widespread benefits to industrialized countries or to the majority of developing countries.[2]

In the United States, trade liberalization has speeded the erosion of the manufacturing sector and contributed to the growing wage inequality of the last 15 years.[3] Among the developing countries, a few superstars have succeeded in achieving rapid export-led growth while a larger number have grown slowly or not at all. Per capita economic growth was negative for sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America from 1980 to 1993, while East Asia achieved an average annual per capita growth of 8.5 percent during the same period (although these rapid Asian growth rates now show signs of slowing).

Too often, the success of the Asian tigers has been confused with the success of free trade. Winning in export markets can but does not have to be linked to a policy of lowering trade barriers. In fact, some of the countries that have pursued trade and financial liberalization policies most aggressively—Mexico, Bolivia, and Argentina—have experienced dismal growth rates. The governments of the East Asian success stories, on the other hand, have tended to intervene heavily in their economies, erecting trade barriers when necessary.

The simple truth is that export-led growth cannot work for everyone at once. Each country that would like to stimulate its economy by tapping external markets must have a recipient country in mind. While the United States has absorbed more than its share of developing country exports over

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[2]The actual policy should not properly be called free trade, but rather a business-oriented form of managed trade. It involves lower trade barriers tied to rules protecting foreign investment from government regulation, and enhanced intellectual property protection.

[3]The manufacturing workforce has shrunk as a share of total (nonfarm) employment, from 27 percent in 1970 to 16 percent in 1995. Some of this shrinkage is due to productivity growth and some to increased imports.

the last decade, there is a limit to its capacity to continue playing this role and for ever-larger groups of countries. Japan and the countries of Europe seem unenthusiastic about taking over this role. Given these limitations, it is irresponsible for the United States and the multilateral financial agencies (the World Bank and the IMF) to continue urging a strategy of export-led growth and unilateral trade liberalization on the less developed countries. The first hot dog stand on a populated stretch of beach might do great business, as might the second and third. But the ninety-ninth might find the market a little thin. The developing countries can and should sell to each other, but this is not likely to provide a huge net stimulus—certainly not on the order that the Asian newly industrializing countries enjoyed in the 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, rather than selling free trade as a panacea to domestic audiences and its trading partners in the developing world, the United States should work to develop viable alternatives.

CHANGING THE RULES

How can the United States change the rules governing international trade and investment to encourage the right kind of development? The first step is to work toward incorporating enforceable labor and environmental standards into trade agreements. This would mean negotiating a core set of standards and then allowing governments to impose penalties on imported goods produced in violation of these standards. Currently, the World Trade Organization (WTO) allows countries to impose penalties on goods produced with forced labor, but does not address other basic labor rights or environmental standards. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contains stringent protections against violations of intellectual property rights, but offers much weaker provisions on labor and the environment.

Most proposals on incorporating labor standards into trade agreements focus on the following: freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, restrictions on child and prison labor, the prohibition of racial or sexual discrimination, minimum standards on workplace health and safety, and a "decent" minimum wage. International environmental standards are more difficult to identify, but include guaranteed access to information on public environmental threats, the right to a safe workplace and living environment, and possibly a

Labor that is cheap because workers are denied the right to join a union is fundamentally different from labor that is cheap because it is plentiful.

long-term plan to phase out the use of certain toxic chemicals.

There is no presumption that establishing such minimum standards will require developing countries to have or enforce labor codes and environmental rules identical to those in the industrialized countries. The point is to agree on some minimum standards, thereby stopping the most egregious abuses by footloose multinational corporations and empowering workers and communities to demand acceptable treatment.

Ideally, these standards would be defined in a multilateral context such as the World Trade Organization, possibly with the cooperation of the International Labor Organization. The United States and the European Union have supported establishing a working group on both labor and environmental standards within the WTO. This is an important first step, but progress cannot be made until the United States and the EU agree that these issues should have a high priority, and the governments of developing countries see these proposals in a positive light. (While many southern nongovernmental organizations and unions support a "social clause" in international trade, southern governments have been resistant to the idea.)

The business communities in the North and the South have also vehemently protested such standards. Businesses have argued that labor and environmental standards would impose an unbearable and costly burden that would cost jobs and dramatically distort trade and investment patterns. Experience has shown, however, that many of these threats fail to materialize. When environmental and labor regulations are implemented in a consistent and predictable manner, businesses become remarkably adept at adjusting. In the United States, new workplace regulations on cotton dust in the early 1980s and on chlorofluorocarbons were incorporated with virtually no loss of jobs or competitiveness. In fact, costs were dramatically reduced during a fairly short period of time and the industries ended up much stronger when confronting international competition than they had been before implementing the new rules.

Similarly, new environmental regulations in the United States turned out to be remarkably benign relative to the doomsday predictions put forth by the industry before they were implemented. Plant shutdowns due to environmental or safety regula-

tions accounted for fewer than 0.1 percent of all large-scale layoffs in the late 1980s, according to government data.

Tying trade to labor and environmental standards should not be seen as an antibusiness policy. While it might reduce business maneuverability somewhat, the effect over the long run should be to protect those businesses that treat their workers well and that are responsible about environmental protection from being forced to compete with businesses that would try to cut costs unscrupulously. Adhering to higher labor and environmental standards might also cut into business profits, but would have the advantages of enhancing social stability and building markets over the long run. Responsible businesses should welcome these measures.

A second element of a new trade policy would legitimize the use of temporary trade barriers when appropriate. For example, in the case of a chronic and unsustainable balance of payments deficit, a short-term import surcharge could be a useful tool. This is actually allowed under current WTO rules, but tends to be looked on unfavorably by policymakers, who fear that it might spur retaliation or earn a protectionist label. Similarly, trade barriers to protect important or vulnerable sectors should be seen as potential policy tools, depending on the specific circumstances. Like any other policies, trade policies should be used selectively and only when their benefits outweigh their costs.

Third, the developing countries need additional debt relief to finance the massive, long-term education and infrastructure they will need to deliver a decent standard of living to their citizens. Some of these funds could be raised through an international speculative transactions tax, and some would continue to come from the budgets of the industrialized countries.[4] The key, however, is to condition future aid or debt relief differently—on improved democracy, human rights, labor rights, and environmental protection, rather than on the rate of privatization and on fiscal austerity. As the economists Robert Goodland and Herman Daly have argued: "Global sustainability, poverty, equity, and security would be improved if debts in severely indebted countries were conditionally written off commensurate with progress toward environmental sustainability." Finally, we need a domestic

macroeconomic policy consistent with full employment at home.

DETAILING THE BENEFITS

What could these policy changes accomplish? They may dampen capital mobility (or hypermobility), reducing a company's incentives to abandon a factory in one country because the workers tried to unionize or the government cracked down on environmental enforcement. They would certainly change the terms on which countries compete with each other for scarce foreign capital: instead of offering the cheapest labor, the most exploitable natural resources, and the most disposable environment, southern governments could offer the best-educated workers, well-built and -maintained infrastructure, and clean air and water. While northern workers would still have to compete with much cheaper southern labor, at least they would no longer be in head-to-head competition with workers who lacked basic human rights.

These changes could impose a socially efficient structure on the process of attracting capital. The current system is both wasteful and irrational. With some basic guidelines in place, companies will be forced back to a calculus of "comparative advantage" that is closer to what the nineteenth-century British economist David Ricardo originally had in mind: climate, factor endowment, and proximity to markets. Labor that is cheap because workers are denied the right to join a union is fundamentally different from labor that is cheap because it is plentiful.

Moving toward the establishment and enforcement of international rules for labor rights and environmental standards will have only a small, concrete effect immediately. Its greater value is in the message it sends to governments and companies about what kinds of behavior will be rewarded and punished in the international trade arena. Just as NAFTA was as important for its symbolic value as for its substance, so too would international recognition of labor and environmental standards in trade agreements raise the profile of these issues at a low cost.

New international rules might also even out the competition for capital. Currently, the bulk of foreign direct investment (FDI) goes to the semi-industrialized "emerging markets." Nearly 40 percent of FDI in 1994 went to China, while another 24 percent went to Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. All of sub-Saharan Africa received only 3.6 percent, and the world's least developed countries received only 1 percent. This

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[4]The speculative transaction tax, which is sometimes called the Tobin tax after Nobel laureate James Tobin, would levy a small fee on international financial transactions. This would both raise money and discourage speculation.

will not change overnight with modifications to trade laws, but uniform standards may help eventually disperse these flows.

New rules would also shift the balance of power toward workers and away from corporations in both the North and the South. The thrust of recent policy has been to enhance the mobility of capital, thus increasing its power over workers and local governments. The policy changes discussed here would at least establish a framework within which capital would be constrained.

There are several things these proposed policy changes will not accomplish. Putting labor and environmental standards into trade agreements is unlikely to return many jobs to the United States and other industrialized countries from the third world. It may, however, stop other jobs from leaving, and it may help workers hold on to good wages and working conditions a little longer.

Nor would such changes choke off growth in the South. Some development advocates fear that labor and environmental standards would stop trade flows and slow growth, denying the developing countries their legitimate comparative advantage in cheap labor and their right to set low environmental standards. These advocates see labor and environmental standards as a selfish protectionist plot by rich countries to keep all the good jobs for themselves.

But this change in trade policy would guide development, not slow it down. By creating incentives for governments and firms to respect basic labor rights and minimum environmental standards, it would give coherence to the inevitable scramble for scarce capital. While conditioning trade on labor and environmental standards may

reduce the flow of investment capital from North to South, this reduction could be easily offset by debt forgiveness. Since not all capital is created equal, a dollar of debt forgiveness targeted for education or infrastructure would be much more valuable than a dollar of investment in an export zone. It would also mitigate some of the negative polarizing effects of trade on workers in the North, especially less educated workers. At the same time, development aid could facilitate the implementation and enforcement of higher standards. Having environmental standards in place would accelerate the transfer of environmental technology, with the additional benefit of boosting the domestic market for high-tech, environmental-compliance products.

Changing the rules for international trade along these lines is part of a long-term plan to build the kind of world we want to live in—more stable and secure, with less poverty in the midst of plenty. Such changes do not involve "turning back the clock" or denying the "inevitability and inexorability" of globalization. Rather, they entail the use of available policy tools to shape the process of globalization in a direction that will benefit a large majority.

Some might question the feasibility of changing trade policy in the near future. The response is that change is feasible because the status quo has failed. If policymakers in the developed countries do not take note of the social disruption and inequalities generated by current trade and investment policies, then these policies will be replaced by ad hoc responses unlikely to be much of an improvement. If progressive and internationally minded people do not address the issue of trade policy, then xenophobic and isolationist alternatives will prevail. ■

Are human rights and national security concerns mutually exclusive? Or is it possible to think about human rights as an aspect of national security? Jack Donnelly argues that "While no country in the world today equates personal security—understood as the effective enjoyment of internationally recognized human rights—with national security, the conflict between the two has been substantially reduced."

Rethinking Human Rights

JACK DONNELLY

The dominant cold war-era conceptions of security emphasized the state protecting itself from foreign threats and from domestic agents of foreign forces.[1] Human rights and security typically were discussed together only in the context of arguments advocating the sacrifice of human rights to the demands of national security.

Cold war America offers a good illustration of these conceptions. At home, McCarthyism was the most dramatic manifestation of a willingness to accept the systematic sacrifice of individual rights in pursuit of the higher objective of national security: anticommunism. Abroad, the United States was even more willing to sacrifice individual rights to perceived security needs. Republicans and Democrats alike readily and often enthusiastically supported repressive anticommunist dictatorships in many countries, including Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, Iran, South Africa, Zaire, South Korea, and the Philippines.

These national security doctrines did not go completely unquestioned. International human rights advocates often argued that the short-term benefits of supporting dictators were more than counterbalanced by the long-term hostility engendered in the people who suffered under the repression. As examples they cited sustained United States support for the shah in Iran and the Somozas in Nicaragua, which they said contributed to national security problems in the late 1970s and early 1980s

with the revolutionary governments that overthrew these leaders. Domestically, civil libertarians challenged the claim that the nation or its citizenry could be made more secure by systematic violations of civil and political rights.

In an era of American politics dominated by the fear of communism, such arguments were largely restricted to the political fringes, while in the Soviet bloc and many third world countries, human rights and national security were viewed in even more antagonistic terms. In the 1990s, however, the international community has shown a new openness to rethinking the relationship between human rights and security.

SECURITY FOR WHOM?

The dominant cold war conception of security emphasized *national* security. Faced with the higher demands of national security, the security, rights, and even lives of individuals not only could but should be sacrificed. It is at least as plausible, however, to see security as a matter of protecting individuals. This is especially true in the highly individualistic United States. In other social and political domains, Americans tend to see the collective interest as the sum of individual interests. If security is seen as starting with and primarily a matter of protecting individuals, conflicts with human rights largely disappear.

Human rights are typically understood as equal and inalienable rights held by every person. Such rights protect and thus secure individuals from standard threats to their dignity and well-being. The right to life protects individuals from arbitrary killing. The right to social security is a right to be protected and supported by society when in need because of age or infirmity. The rights to freedom of conscience, belief, and speech secure for the individual a domain of personal moral autonomy.

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[1] I would like to thank my colleagues Micheline Ishay and David Goldfischer for sharing with me their ideas and work in progress on this topic. For the initial fruits of their labors see "Human Rights and National Security: A False Dichotomy," *New Political Science*, Spring 1996.

If the nation is considered an aggregation of its individual members rather than a distinct and superior collective entity, then national security arises from the personal security—that is, the human rights—of all individual citizens. Indeed, measuring the enjoyment of human rights provides a good first approximation of a country's security. Even external threats to the nation can be readily reformulated in the language of rights-based personal security. The threat of foreign attack, for example, creates insecurity because it endangers basic rights to life, liberty, and political self-determination.

During the cold war the elements of such a personal security conception became a formal part of East-West relations with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Principle VII of the Helsinki accords called for "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." Another element of the accords, the so-called Basket III provision, ("Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields") placed human rights concerns on a level comparable to that of the traditional political-military and economic issues that made up Baskets I and II of the accord. The security of citizens, understood in terms of respect for their human rights, thus became an established concern for East-West relations.

Through the Helsinki process and related efforts on behalf of Soviet dissidents, the United States and its allies in effect insisted that "security" that sacrificed individual human rights was not real security. At the same time, however, in supporting military governments in Guatemala and Argentina, for example, the United States was willing to accept "dirty wars" carried out by these governments against their own populations in the name of national security. That the human rights of the people of Guatemala and Argentina were jeopardized in the process never entered the geopolitical calculus.

Cold war national security doctrines in both the East and the West excluded some portion of the citizenry: "class enemies" in the communist bloc, "fellow travelers" in the United States during the McCarthy era, and "subversives" targeted by Latin American military regimes. Whether in communist China or anticommunist Argentina, certain individuals and groups, often simply because of their beliefs or associations, were in effect treated as less than human; they were infections to be eliminated, cancers to be removed.

Without political protection for human rights, life may not be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short,". . .but it cannot be worthy of a human being.

Not only were the human costs of such an understanding of security immense, but the suffering that resulted rarely contributed to a stronger or safer nation. Governments that set themselves at war against a significant portion of their population can never be safe because they erode the real strength and security of the nation, namely, the personal security of its citizens. Conversely, if each individual is secure in his or her enjoyment of human rights, the security of the nation has largely been achieved.

This is not to deny that individual and national security may conflict in some instances. But Western liberal democratic regimes derive much of their moral and political legitimacy from a conception of politics that sees government principally as an institution that assures the enjoyment of the natural or human rights of all citizens. During the cold war these sustaining and legitimating political beliefs were set aside far too often, especially in foreign policy. The United States in particular was willing to sacrifice personal security in the name of national security in ways that flouted and degraded the very values that justified the struggle against communism.

A personal security conception turns around arguments in favor of tolerating human rights abuses by allies. It suggests that external threats cannot be successfully met by a strategy that multiplies internal enemies. Long-run stability cannot be achieved by strategies that alienate and dehumanize segments of the population. Conversely, an immediate focus on human rights can contribute to creating and maintaining strong, stable, and secure allies.

Post–cold war United States foreign policy provides a glimpse of this emerging doctrine. During the cold war, American tolerance of anticommunist oligarchies and military dictatorships in Latin America was almost unlimited. Today, when the United States emphasizes democracy, it means not just political support for the United States but something close to acknowledging internationally recognized civil and political rights. Even in a country such as Guatemala—where the military remains the real power behind the government and human rights conditions can only be described as better than in the past but far from good—the United States has forcefully insisted on the elimination of direct violence against the citizenry and the opening of a space for nonviolent social activism and political opposition.

We also see a new interpenetration of human rights and security ideas in multilateral politics. Because of a growing emphasis on peacemaking, peacebuilding, and preventive diplomacy, the international community is beginning to act on the premise that human rights and security can be positively linked. Since the late 1980s, UN peacekeeping operations have regularly received human rights mandates, in sharp contrast to the almost complete separation of these two domains of activity in earlier decades.

Questions may be raised about the extent of this new understanding and its viability if the post–cold war political consensus in the UN were to collapse. Nonetheless, the linkage of human rights and security in multilateral peacekeeping suggests an evolving understanding of security along more individualistic, rights-protective lines.

SECURITY AGAINST WHAT?

Defining the appropriate subject of security as the individual person and his or her human rights points to the threats against which persons should be secured. The substantive threats that must be countered are violations of internationally recognized human rights. The primary sources of those threats are states and markets.

Realist conceptions of international relations have traditionally seen security threatened primarily from outside the state. As was noted, the dominant cold war conception also emphasized external threats, supplemented by internal agents of subversion. A personal security perspective holds states equally responsible for the dangers they pose to their own citizens.

The liberal democratic social contract tradition that underlies contemporary international human rights norms has an ambivalent attitude toward the state. The state is an indispensable instrument for realizing rights. Without political protection for human rights, life may not be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short," as Hobbes put it, but it cannot be worthy of a human being. Yet the power of the modern state is perhaps the single greatest threat to the enjoyment of human rights and personal security. Therefore, many human rights—for example, the rights to life, protection against arbitrary arrest and detention, habeas corpus, and the presumption of innocence—protect the individual from the state.

A conception of personal security based on internationally recognized human rights, however, must be no less concerned with protecting individuals from the threats to dignity posed by modern markets. Americans rarely speak about issues such as health care, social security, and employment as human rights. These, however, are included in authoritative international human rights documents such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenants on Human Rights on a footing equal with that of civil and political rights. A growing number of countries recognize these as human rights issues. Even in the United States, political concern over personal security increasingly focuses on social and economic issues.

All Western governments are deeply committed to protecting their citizens against many standard threats posed by capitalist markets. One of the defining characteristics of the liberal democratic welfare state is the attempt to balance the competing goals of market efficiency and a relatively egalitarian conception of social equity. Beyond such obvious examples as unemployment insurance and regulations on working conditions, Western welfare states emphasize smoothing out inequities in market distributions of resources and opportunities and providing a wide range of social services, such as health care, education, and support for children, the aged, and the infirm.

Defining substantive threats to security in terms of internationally recognized human rights also challenges some conventional ideas about national economic security. Students of international relations often define vital national interests as those a state would be willing to protect through the use of force. A personal security perspective challenges the automatic linkage between vital national interests and national security. Consider a personal analogy. It may be in my interest to become extremely wealthy. I might even be willing to devote most of my available resources to that pursuit. But such wealth would not, in the end, make much of an additional contribution to my security. Similarly, the nation may have an interest, even an intense interest, in the income or wealth generated by overseas economic activities that has at best an exceedingly tenuous and indirect connection to national or personal security.

A personal security perspective also stresses distributional issues that conventional national interest conceptions ignore. For example, Western firms that export jobs to low-wage countries typically profit from such moves. As a result, resources may flow into the home country. But this national interest is achieved at the cost of creating personal insecurity for those who lose their jobs. The case

becomes even more problematic if the firm earns its profits through exploitative business practices that threaten the security of overseas employees, their families, or communities (for example, by allowing unsafe working conditions or housing, or by releasing dangerous manufacturing by-products into the environment).

Protecting disadvantaged individuals from national and international markets points to a further dimension of the conflict between collective and individual conceptions of security. The efficiencies of national and international markets may provide more resources overall, but markets do nothing to assure that everyone benefits: some may be forced to suffer so that "all" may benefit. The reasoning here is similar to standard liberal arguments against police states. We all may be safer on the street in a police state, but severe infringements of the rights and personal security of a few is too high a price to pay.

A personal security perspective, whether applied domestically or internationally, seeks to assure that no one is to be harmed or left hopelessly behind while pursuing collective benefits. Personal security in all its dimensions—civil, political, economic, and social—lies not in high average aggregate protections, but rather in assuring that every individual enjoys certain minimum levels of protection.

We may be witnessing some change in dominant ideas on the relationship between international economic interests and national security. Over the past three decades there has been a dramatic decline in the willingness of the United States to use force to secure foreign economic interests. For example, in the mid-1960s the United States regularly used force and the threat of force to protect American investments in Latin America, something that would be largely unthinkable today.

I see no evidence, however, that a concern for personal economic security and economic and social rights is penetrating either United States or multilateral international economic policy. American-backed, IMF-imposed structural adjustment programs have required dozens of countries to eliminate food subsidies and dismantle social service programs that sought to buffer vulnerable segments of society from the destructive consequences of markets.

There may be good arguments for such sacrifices of human rights and personal economic security, but advocates of these sacrifices rarely feel compelled to make them. While the very real costs of command economies are appropriately contrasted with the efficiencies of markets, little consideration is given to the "negative externalities" of markets, the "unintended"—but not unknown or even unplanned—consequences for those least equipped to compete in these new markets. Furthermore, the apparent inconsistency between national policies supporting strong welfare states and international policies pressing for free markets remains largely unaddressed.

SECURITY BY WHAT MEANS?

Throughout most of history, families and local communities were the agencies by which personal security was achieved. Modern states and markets, however, have transformed and subordinated these institutions and made the state an essential agent in providing personal (not to mention national) security. This central security role of the state is closely paralleled in contemporary international human rights law and practice.

Most states today accept as authoritative the international human rights norms expressed in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nearly 130 countries are parties to the International Covenants on Human Rights. But these and other international human rights instruments leave implementation almost entirely to individual states. For example, the enforcement provisions of the covenants simply require states to submit periodic reports to an independent committee of experts.

Although human rights have become an established subject for bilateral and multilateral foreign policy, neither a state nor the United Nations has the authority to use force on behalf of internationally recognized human rights. Few states are willing even to use the stronger means legally available to them to pursue international human rights objectives. And human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOS), such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, are even more limited in the means available to them, relying almost entirely on the power of publicity and the force of shame.

Torture, for example, is prohibited by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 5) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 7), as well as by the 1984 Convention against Torture. But the Committee against Torture, created by the 1984 convention, is limited to investigating instances of torture. Its findings are not even technically binding on states. And for a state to use force on behalf of foreign torture victims would be a clear violation of international law.

Many victims of torture have been helped, and many other people have been saved from becoming torture victims, by the activities of international and regional organizations, states, and NGOs. But this has occurred only through the intermediation of national governments. For all the recent developments in the international politics of human rights, states retain nearly exclusive authority to oversee human rights in their own territories. States are the agency contemporary international society relies on to implement human rights and provide personal security.

SECURITY BEYOND THE STATE

In organizing the discussion around individuals and states, I have implicitly cast individuals as citizens of states. Individuals, however, might also be seen in more cosmopolitan terms—that is, as members of the global political community. This would shift our focus not so much toward personal security but toward global security.

What we might call "international security" can be seen as the sum of the particular security interests of states or their collective security interests (for example, in maintaining a stable balance of power). Global security would take a similarly broad, systemic view of the range of security but without granting a privileged position to the security interests of states. A global security perspective would give special emphasis to supranational means of providing security to all members of the worldwide community of humankind. Systematic human rights violations anywhere would thus become a legitimate security concern for everyone, and institutions of the international community would be expected to have a special role in assuring the enjoyment of internationally recognized human rights.

I see no substantial evidence of such a cosmopolitan global security perspective in recent international practice. We can see dents in the state-centric system that implements internationally recognized human rights, at least in some of the more horrific and well-publicized cases of mass insecurity. Genocide is no longer considered a matter of sovereign prerogative, as it was, for example, in Cambodia in the 1970s and Ethiopia in the 1980s. The multilateral humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Rwanda, as late and limited as they may have been, provide precedents for international action to rescue people from the near total collapse of civil authority or from genocide. The war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the decision of the UN General Assembly last year to create an international criminal tribunal, suggest a dramatically reduced international tolerance for genocide.

It would be premature at best, and probably seriously misguided, to generalize from genocide to human rights: mass murder provokes a much stronger emotional and political response than, for example, restrictions on freedom of association, electoral corruption, or arbitrary arrest and detention. Likewise, it would be misleading to take the international response to the collapse of civil authority in Somalia as a model for future responses to insecurities caused by a government; when the government is directly responsible for human rights violations, issues of sovereignty have greater force, and intervention is likely to have higher costs. As we saw, more ordinary human rights violations by governments cannot be remedied by coercive international enforcement. Not only do states retain principal responsibility for implementing human rights; most aggressively and effectively assert their sovereign right to determine how citizens enjoy (or do not enjoy) their human rights and personal security.

Nonetheless, the international role in providing personal security is growing. For example, the creation of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 1993 suggests a substantial upgrading of multilateral international concern. Bilaterally, human rights has become not only a well-established but a growing concern of foreign policy in an increasing number of countries. Even in the United States, where international human rights issues were matters of central and intense political controversy in the early and mid-1980s, human rights have become a relatively nonpartisan foreign policy issue.

While no country in the world today equates personal security—understood as the effective enjoyment of internationally recognized human rights—with national security, the conflict between the two has been substantially reduced. Furthermore, even if states remain the principal agency by which human rights and personal security are affirmed or denied, the cold war emphasis on the security of the nation-state has been eroded. As we approach the new millennium, a vision of security achieved through the enjoyment of individual human rights seems to have achieved at least a foothold in international society. ∎

ON HUMAN SECURITY

On Humane Governance:
Toward a New Global Politics
By Richard Falk. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. 304 pp., $45 cloth, $16.95 paper.

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized as inalienable a broad array of civil, political, economic, and social rights, including access to education, health care, and an adequate standard of living; it also established the right of every person to "a social and international order" in which those rights could be achieved.

Forty-eight years and at least 130 wars later, world military spending exceeds the combined incomes of the poorest half of the world's people. More than 1 billion people live in abject poverty, lacking adequate food, shelter, clothing, health care, education, and, most critically, control over the political and economic decisions that affect their lives.

Why the gap? Why has the international community, and its representative, the UN, failed so spectacularly? And why does it continue to fail in the post–cold war setting? Most important, what can be done to empower international institutions to move toward the goals set forth nearly half a century ago?

Richard Falk, a prominent international law professor and passionate defender of human rights, tackles these and other questions in his dense but inspiring work, *On Humane Governance.* Falk argues that the UN and other international institutions have failed to uphold their moral commitments because their actions have been subject to the geopolitical calculations of powerful states. Certainly this was the case during the cold war, when the two superpowers' opposing strategic objectives marginalized the Security Council. Falk convincingly maintains that the 1990s have seen the continuing subordination of moral and legal considerations to geopolitics. Thus it is that the Security Council, following the United States' lead, can respond to Iraqi aggression with overwhelming force yet remain paralyzed when genocide is perpetrated in Bosnia and Rwanda.

Double standards may well be the defining feature of realist geopolitics. Imperial powers—from sixteenth-century Spain to the superpowers of the cold war—have always decried the imperialism of their rivals. That the United States can ignore the 1986 World Court condemnation of its belligerent acts against Nicaragua, and then invoke international law and order to justify the war against Iraq, shows that it is not the law so much as the power of the law's interpreter that matters.

The key, then, to establishing the international rule of law is to make the institutions responsible for its enforcement more powerful than the states or other actors that might violate it. Despite the lamentable results thus far, Falk sees the potential for doing just that.

Since the seventeenth century, the sovereign, territorial state has been the defining feature of the world system. That sovereignty has for some time now been eroding, mostly as a result of globalizing forces but also because of fragmenting pressure from within states. What is emerging, according to Falk, is a politically, economically, and culturally integrated global reality that he calls "geogovernance."

The form geogovernance will take is the subject of political struggle throughout the world today. The strongest force undermining state sovereignty has been the globalization of market activity, facilitated by new information technology. Market forces—and in many developing countries, international lending institutions—have severely curtailed states' ability to set economic policy; virtually every country now pursues export-led growth, cuts in government spending, corporate-profit-enhancing tax policies, and a regulatory and labor environment similarly favorable to capital.

Thus far, economic globalization has taken place in a virtual regulatory vacuum, as Falk notes. To the extent that a framework governing the global market does exist, it is rigged in favor of capital and against people: precedence is given in most agreements, including development loans, to ensuring the free mobility of money and goods; and institutions like the World Trade Organization, whose officeholders are unelected and unaccountable to any body politic, can exert tremendous pressure on governments to reverse national policies that impede trade or constrain profitability. This is true even when the policies in question are meant to promote social well-being, economic equality, or

environmental sustainability—all of which have been affirmed as universal goals in a series of declarations by the international community.

This framework, which Falk calls "globalization from above," is increasingly being challenged by transnational networks of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) representing disparate groups of people and expressing a wide range of concerns. Falk calls this countertrend "globalization from below" and sees in it the possibility of pushing the present, unjust world order in a more humane direction. Though NGOs most often arise in response to specific needs or local problems, their outlook is increasingly global and their politics sophisticated. Furthermore, despite their myriad concerns, these groups agree on broad goals: universal observance of human rights; broad access to health, education, and gainful employment; democratization of the political arena at all levels; long-term investment in human security through the protection of the environment; progress toward equality; rejection of nationalism as the primary foundation for political identity or allegiance; and, perhaps above all, commitment to nonviolence or near nonviolence in their struggles. This last is one of the most promising features of the present historical moment, and embodies in Falk's view a nascent "post-Leninist revolutionary politics" that values peace, reconciliation, and constitutionalism over ideological purity.

The explosion over the past 15 years in the number of NGOs and the extent of their transnational cooperation can be attributed partly to advances in information and communications technology. This growth has also been aided by a series of UN conferences on social and environmental issues, by a tremendous increase in the acceptance of democratic ideals worldwide, and by the decline of divisive and stale ideological debates on the left. NGOs have been especially successful in carrying out humanitarian operations and legitimating and even protecting human rights. They have also prodded governments into action (as well as taking action themselves) on environmental issues, disarmament, family planning, the fight against apartheid, and the rights of indigenous peoples. And, most significantly, their very existence constitutes the beginning of a global civil society, which often produces the only legal- or ethically-based voice in international debates.

Falk believes that this global civil society offers the best hope for a democratic and humane world order. By invoking the normative framework set forth in international agreements and precedents, NGOs can pressure state and market entities to consider the human consequences of their actions. Human rights groups have long operated in this manner, and peace, environmental, and labor groups have begun to do so as well. These movements can also push international institutions to extend the normative framework. (A notable example is the recent success of NGOs in extracting from the World Court a ruling on the illegality of the use or threat of using nuclear weapons.) International institutions still lack enforcement capacity, particularly in relation to strong states. Falk advocates a movement to establish such capacity; in the meantime, the forces of global civil society are making it increasingly difficult for states to ignore international norms and commitments.

On Humane Governance is animated by a moral clarity and a passionate commitment to justice; unfortunately, a similar clarity does not extend to the author's prose. One frequently gets the impression that Falk has three more ideas for every one he articulates. No doubt a reason for this is that the book, while written by Falk alone, draws heavily on the thinking of dozens of individuals associated with a five-year study of the emerging global civil society. In trying to offer a comprehensive and cohesive argument while also including diverse perspectives, Falk often jumps from one point to another, or returns to an earlier point; the result is a somewhat circular, nebulous discussion. The essential themes, however, emerge time and again, and the whole is united by an overriding commitment to a moral objective: to "allow the varied peoples of the whole world to participate in the reflourishing of social, political, and cultural life in the century to come."

Falk's vision is utopian, and has been criticized as such. But his is a humble utopianism: he acknowledges the impossibility of creating a perfect world, but affirms "the validity of establishing political horizons on the basis of what is *desirable*." This is the essence of the humanistic tradition. For Falk, humane governance and democracy are by definition not end points but processes that sometimes yield surprising results: the relatively nonviolent overthrow of repressive governments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and tremendous worldwide progress—unforeseen when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948—in the attainment of civil and political (though not economic or social) rights. In an era when the only idealism not scoffed at is that of free

marketeers, Falk's principled voice is invaluable, and his levelheaded assessment of the prospects for a humane world order deserves a close look from scholars and activists alike.

Douglas Watson

The Price of a Dream: The Story of the Grameen Bank, and the Idea that is Helping the Poor to Change Their Lives
By David Bornstein. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. 370 pp., $25.

Women at the Center: Grameen Bank Borrowers after One Decade
By Helen Todd. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996. 248 pp., $49.95.

Started in Bangladesh in 1976 by economist Muhammed Yunus, the Grameen Bank is a human development project that seeks to enhance the earning capacity of rural villagers by extending credit to establish and support modest enterprises. It has lent more than $1.5 billion to the impoverished villagers of Bangladesh and is being replicated in other countries in Southeast Asia, Africa, and North and South America. The bank is noted in development circles for a number of unique features—it focuses on the traditionally powerless women members of the poorer half of the population as its primary clientele, uses group pressure in place of traditional material loan collateral, and maintains itself as a viable capitalist enterprise with a successful 97 percent loan and interest repayment rate.

Journalist David Bornstein's book is an attempt at both a history and a portrait of the Grameen Bank, its founder, and some of the clients Bornstein came to know over the course of his four years of research on the bank. To this end, Bornstein pursues a distinctly personal approach, portraying Yunus's odyssey in forming the bank and the effect that the loans and the schooling in Grameen philosophy that comes with the loans have had on the lives of the bank's borrowers. At first glance this is a warm and engaging story, told with an eye for detail and sensitively observed changes wrought by the austere elegance of the Grameen Bank in action, but as the book progresses a sense of moral instruction begins to cloud its objectivity.

Bornstein does have critical moments. Yunus's errors at the outset of the bank's development are discussed, and Bornstein reveals his sense of Yunus as personally unapproachable as well as his initial discomfort with the Grameen ideology that requires from its members a special salute, mandatory exercises, and the chanting of the bank's "Sixteen Decisions" (ranging from maintaining "Discipline, Unity, Courage, and Hard Work" to a promise to boil unclean drinking water) at the beginning of each group meeting. Yet inevitably even these relatively minor criticisms are quickly retracted. Yunus is a visionary to be described in the same words of esteem that Einstein applied to Gandhi; the Grameen salute is a means of allowing a friendly greeting between men and women in a society that does not allow contact between the sexes; and the chanting of slogans is traditional in the largely illiterate Bengalese society.

Bornstein's tendency to uncritically accept Yunus's account, and the neat way in which almost every section ends like the neighborhood feature stories in the local newspaper—"Indeed, the Grameen Bank has marketed small loans like burgers and fries. With millions served"—are so unrelenting in their glowing positivity that they arouse skepticism in the reader. The cumulative effect is to raise doubt as to whether Bornstein's work is an accurate description of an innovative and effective means of ending poverty or the effusive praise of a convert.

Neither a journalistic background nor a professed belief in the cause need prevent a more balanced approach to the subject, as Helen Todd's book shows. A journalist who edits a newsletter for the Grameen-style lending project in Malaysia known as CASHPOR, Todd, like Bornstein, relates the Grameen Bank's performance in large part through personal narrative, but in the context of a more comprehensive theoretical approach.

Todd addresses head-on the challenges of Grameen's critics, showing that the bank gives many of its long-term borrowers the opportunity to buy land, which ensures future security, and disputing claims that Grameen-style lending does little for the women themselves and serves only to make them conduits of aid to husbands and children while increasing the woman's workload and assigning her the role of debt collector. The picture that emerges is one of an organization that uses practical means to work within existing social structures to make a real difference in women's lives, an achievement more readily endorsed on the basis of hard evidence and clear argument than it is on grounds of praise and exhortation alone.

Megan J. Breslin

September 1996

INTERNATIONAL

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Sept. 27—After a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Norway, US Defense Secretary William Perry says, without elaborating, that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are "not ready" for membership in NATO.

United Nations
Sept. 1—Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali suspends a recent agreement allowing Iraqi oil sales to finance civilian relief; on August 31 Iraqi forces took control of the city of Erbil, located in the so-called Kurdish "safe area" in northern Iraq; a 1991 UN Security Council resolution forbade Iraqi persecution of ethnic minorities, including Kurds living in the northern region.

AFGHANISTAN
Sept. 11—The Taliban, a conservative Islamic guerrilla group, captures the city of Jalalabad; the rebels now control almost two-thirds of the country and a major supply route to the capital, Kabul, which remains in government hands.
Sept. 15—Government jets bomb Jalalabad, killing 6 people and causing thousands of the city's residents to flee toward Pakistan.
Sept. 26—Thousands of residents, troops loyal to President Burhanuddin Rabbani, and aid workers flee Kabul as Taliban rebels advance on the city.
Sept. 27—Taliban rebels capture Kabul and execute former President Najibullah and his brother, Shahpur Ahmadzai; Najibullah ruled until 1992, when he was forced from office.

ALGERIA
Sept. 14—Major opposition parties either boycott or are barred from a 2-day conference in Algiers on whether to move toward elections and a constitutional revision.

ARMENIA
Sept. 23—President Levon Ter-Petrossian claims victory in yesterday's presidential election, the 1st since Armenia became independent in 1991; 40,000 protesters gather outside Ter-Petrossian's house in Yerevan to demand that he step down; Ter-Petrossian's main opponent, former Prime Minister Vazgen Manukian, accuses Ter-Petrossian of fraud in the election.
Sept. 26—Governments troops beat dozens of antigovernment protesters and make an unknown number of arrests; Interior Ministry troops arrest 6 opposition members in parliament after the opposition members were attacked by pro-government members during an emergency session of parliament; the government says it will try 8 opposition members, including Manukian, on charges of attempting to stage a coup; it is reported that at least 2 people were killed in yesterday's protests.
Sept. 27—In a statement distributed by his wife, Manukian, who is reportedly hiding outside Yerevan to avoid arrest, denounces Ter-Petrossian's government as an "illegal power" and calls for quiet resistance; international election monitors say there is reason to believe opposition charges that fraud enabled Ter-Petrossian to avoid a runoff with Manukian in the election.
Sept. 29—The Central Electoral Commission declares Ter-Petrossian the winner of the September 22 presidential election, with 52 percent of the vote to Manukian's 42 percent.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Sept. 14—Hundreds of thousands of Bosnians vote in elections for a 3-person presidency, a national parliament, regional parliaments, presidents for ethnic enclaves, and provincial councils.
Sept. 18—US Secretary of State Warren Christopher declares the elections a success and says that US peacekeeping troops will be able to leave Bosnia by December 20, the day the original Dayton peace accord mandate will expire; NATO Secretary General Javier Solano pledges that the organization will not abandon Bosnia after December 20.
Sept. 19—The German government announces that 320,000 Bosnian refugees in Germany must begin returning on October 1.
Sept. 21—Nearly complete returns from the September 14 elections are made public; in voting for the 3-member presidency, which was conducted along ethnic lines, Alija Izetbegovic wins the Muslim seat with 80 percent of the Muslim vote; Kresimir Zubak wins the Croat seat with 88 percent of the Croat vote; and Momcilo Krajisnik wins the Serb seat with 68 percent of the Serb vote; Izetbegovic, with the most votes cast overall, will be chairman of the presidency. The Muslim-led Party of Democratic Action wins 19 of the 42 seats in the national House of Representatives, while the Serb Democratic Party takes 9 and the Croatian Democratic Union 7; the other 7 seats are won by opposition parties; hard-line nationalist parties dominate regional elections in the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation.
Sept. 29—The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe certifies the September 14 election results as valid; the certification allows the UN to lift sanctions on Yugoslavia and on the Bosnian Serb republic; OSCE mission leader Robert Frowick says that the elections were neither free nor truly democratic, but insists that it is more important to establish a government than to wait until better conditions for elections emerge; the most serious accusations involve a greater than 100 percent voter turnout, presumably the result of ballot box stuffing by officials from the 3 ruling parties.
Sept. 30—Izetbegovic, Krajisnik, and Zubak meet in Sarajevo to discuss the establishment of a new government.

BURMA
Sept. 28—Riot police arrest dozens of supporters of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a democracy activist and leader of the opposition National League for Democracy, as they gather to hear her customary Saturday speech; a congress of the league has been blocked by riot police and troops for the past 2 days.

BURUNDI
Sept. 4—Fighting between largely Hutu rebels and the Tutsi-dominated army intensifies near the capital city of Bujumbura; exiled leaders of the Hutu political party FRODEBU declare their support for the rebels.

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Sept. 5—Fighting near Bujumbura continues; the military says 20 rebels and 3 soldiers have been killed in the past 2 days.

Sept. 10—Roman Catholic Archbishop Joachim Ruhuna and 2 nuns are killed in an apparent ambush by Hutu rebels 60 miles from Bujumbura in Gitega province.

Sept. 12—Army troops kill 7 Hutu rebels in a battle in Gitega province.

CAMBODIA

Sept. 5—The military announces that it has sent troops to help Ieng Sary's breakaway Khmer Rouge faction repel an attack from Pol Pot loyalists in Banteay Meanchey province; at least 1,000 civilians have fled into neighboring Thailand to escape the fighting.

Sept. 14—King Norodom Sihanouk grants amnesty to Ieng Sary for his involvement in the killing of as many as 2 million people during Khmer Rouge rule in the 1970s.

COLOMBIA

Sept. 1—In one of the deadliest rebel offensives in decades, guerrillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have killed at least 80 policemen and soldiers in attacks throughout the country in the last 2 days; 54 soldiers were killed and 14 wounded in the biggest attack, which took place at an army base in the southwestern Putamayo region.

Sept. 2—Officials report that 41 soldiers are still missing after the guerrilla attack in the Putamayo region; Defense Minister Juan Carlos Esquerra says that the guerrillas apparently have taken the soldiers hostage.

Sept. 7—In their 2d attack this week, FARC guerrillas kill at least 23 police officers and soldiers in clashes at a site 30 miles north of Bogotá and a military base in southern Guaviare province; FARC guerrillas also sabotage part of the largest oil pipeline in the country.

Sept. 21—Eight pounds of heroin are found on President Ernesto Samper's jet before he flies to a UN conference in New York on global strategies to fight drugs; the government says the drugs were put on the plane in an attempt to embarrass the president.

CYPRUS

Sept. 8—One Turkish Cypriot soldier is killed and another wounded when unknown assailants fire on their post near the UN buffer zone in northern Cyprus.

ESTONIA

Sept. 20—President Lennart Meri, a writer and historian, wins a 2d term in secret balloting in the electoral college; he promises greater integration with Europe.

ETHIOPIA

Sept. 20—In Addis Ababa, the central criminal high court sentences 3 Egyptian members of the militant Islamic Group to death after convicting them of the June 26, 1995, attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while Mubarak was visiting the country.

GAMBIA

Sept. 27—Yahya Jammeh, a military leader who seized power in a coup in 1994, defeats 3 civilian opponents in a presidential vote tainted by numerous abuses, including the outlawing of opposition parties and the beating or killing of opposition supporters.

GERMANY

Sept. 10—Six former East German generals are sentenced to prison for ordering the shooting of fugitives trying to escape to West Germany during communist rule in East Germany.

GREECE

Sept. 22—The governing Panhellenic Socialist Movement wins at least 162 of the 300 seats in national legislative elections held today.

GUATEMALA

Sept. 19—In a meeting mediated by the UN, the government and leftist rebels sign a peace agreement to reduce the power and size of the military; this agreement is considered a step toward ending the longest guerrilla war in the Western Hemisphere.

INDIA

Sept. 21—Former Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, accused of fraud, resigns as leader of the Congress Party.

Sept. 24—Sitaram Kesri, chosen yesterday to be the new Congress Party leader, reaffirms his party's support for Prime Minister H. D. Deve Gowda's center-left coalition.

IRAQ

Sept. 1—Relief workers report that Iraqi forces have left the Kurdish city of Erbil in the so-called Kurdish "safe area" in northern Iraq; at least 100 casualties have been reported since an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 Iraqi troops in concert with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) seized the city yesterday to crush the opposing Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); Iraqi troops are now converging on Sulaimaniya, another Kurdish city in the "safe area."

Sept. 3—The US launches 2 cruise missile strikes against southern Iraqi military targets and US President Bill Clinton orders a permanent 60-mile extension of the southern Iraqi "no-flight" zone declared by the US and coalition forces at the conclusion of the 1991 Persian Gulf War; the extension brings the no-fly zone to the southern suburbs of Baghdad.

Sept. 8—KDP forces seize the city of Koi Sanjaq, another northern Iraq Kurdish enclave, and drive out PUK troops.

Sept. 9—Approximately 2,000 KDP soldiers take the city of Sulaimaniya, the remaining PUK stronghold.

Sept. 11—The US says it is sending F-117 "Stealth" fighters to Kuwait and moves 4 B-52 bombers to an Indian Ocean base closer to Iraq.

Sept. 12—The US deploys the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* to the Red Sea, within range to attack Iraq; the US aircraft carrier *Carl Vinson* is already in the Persian Gulf.

Sept. 13—The government announces it will not fire on American jets enforcing the northern and southern no-flight zones and halts repair of northern air-defense sites; the US, which had threatened massive strikes against Iraqi targets in the past several days if such repairs were not halted, says it will continue to amass forces in the region.

ISRAEL

Sept. 4—At the Erez military camp on the northern Israeli-Gaza border, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Yasir Arafat meet for the 1st time since Netanyahu's election on May 29; both state their commitment to the peace process.

Sept. 18—Former Prime Minister Shimon Peres announces he will seek neither the prime ministership in the 2000 elections nor continued leadership of the Labor Party in 1997.

Sept. 19—Israeli authorities approve construction of approximately 3,800 new homes in West Bank Jewish settlements; under the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian peace accords, neither side may act to change the status of the West Bank or Gaza Strip prior to agreement on a final peace treaty.

Sept. 25—In the West Bank city of Ramallah, Israeli and Palestinian forces exchange fire, killing at least 5 Palestinians and injuring hundreds of others; the exchanges erupted after Israeli soldiers fired rubber bullets into a crowd of more than 1,000 Palestinian protesters; Israeli and Palestinian forces also fire on each other during protests outside Bethlehem, injuring at least 14 people; the Palestinians were protesting the Israeli government's opening yesterday of a new entrance to an archeological tunnel along the western wall of the Temple Mount, a site sacred to both Jews and Muslims.

Sept. 26—Fighting continues on the West Bank and spreads to the Gaza Strip; 39 Palestinians and 11 Israelis have been killed and hundreds on both sides injured.

Sept. 27—Seven Palestinians and 3 Israelis are reported killed in violence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the archeological tunnel entrance opened by the Israeli government on September 24 is closed.

ITALY

Sept. 15—A movement calling for northern Italy's secession, led by Umberto Bossi's Northern League, arrives in Venice after a 3-day river journey meant to rally support; the movement declares independence for the mythical state of Padania; the turnout of 10,000 people is far lower than expected.

Sept. 18—Police officers enter the headquarters of the Northern League, seeking evidence of anti-constitutional activities; League leader Umberto Bossi calls the search "an act of pure fascism."

JAPAN

Sept. 8—Citizens of the island chain of Okinawa overwhelmingly approve a nonbinding resolution calling for a reduction in the number of US military bases in the chain.

Sept. 27—Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto dissolves parliament and schedules elections for October 20.

KOREA, SOUTH

Sept. 18—A damaged North Korean submarine is found near the east coast city of Kangnung, and 11 dead North Korean soldiers are discovered in a mountain glade; a North Korean soldier, captured alive, says the submarine had carried 20 soldiers, including a team of infiltrators, to South Korea; their purpose is unknown.

Sept. 19—South Korean troops kill 7 North Korean commandos; a senior government official says that the infiltration makes food aid from South to North Korea unlikely.

Sept. 22—The captain of the grounded North Korean submarine is killed in a gun battle with South Korean troops; in another battle, an infiltrator and 2 South Korean soldiers are killed.

Sept. 23—North Korea demands the return of its stranded submarine, saying engine trouble caused it to run aground during a routine training mission.

Sept. 28—South Korean troops kill the 2d-in-command of the grounded North Korean submarine, bringing to 21 the total North Korean dead.

Sept. 29—South Korean military officials charge that the stranded North Korean submarine was equipped with rockets and that the crew included assassins and spies who were trying to set up a larger infiltration.

Sept. 30—South Korean troops kill another infiltrator.

KUWAIT

Sept. 16—The government agrees to allow 3,300 additional US soldiers to be deployed within its borders.

LEBANON

Sept. 13—Israeli helicopters fire rockets at Hezbollah guerrillas based north of the Israeli "security zone" in southern Lebanon; earlier today 1 guerrilla was killed when Israeli soldiers attacked a group of infiltrators in its security zone.

MEXICO

Sept. 1—In his state of the union address, President Ernesto Zedillo promises to fight "with the full force of the state" guerrillas from the Popular Revolutionary Army, a rebel group that killed at least 14 people last week; he says that "today less than ever can violence be justified."

Sept. 3—Zapatista guerrillas, who staged an uprising in the state of Chiapas in January 1994, sever peace negotiations with President Zedillo, saying that the government has not delivered on its promises; the guerrillas claim that the Mexican army continues to harass Zapatista soldiers, despite a cease-fire agreement.

Sept. 27—Officials announce that police officers and government troops have arrested 11 people this week in an Oaxaca village, including the mayor and other high-ranking municipal officials, on suspicion that they may be founding members of the Popular Revolutionary Army.

PAKISTAN

Sept. 20—Murtaza Bhutto, the brother and a political opponent of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and 6 of his followers are killed by police in a shoot-out that police say ensued when their cars refused to stop at security checkpoints.

PORTUGAL

Macao
Sept. 22—Residents begin voting in elections for the legislative assembly; the elections are the last in almost 5 centuries of Portuguese rule; the territory will be handed over to China in 1999.

RUSSIA

Sept. 3—National security adviser Aleksandr Lebed says in a news conference that approximately 80,000 people have been killed over the course of the 21-month war in Chechnya and 240,000 have been wounded; previous casualty figures had

estimated 30,000 to 40,000 fatalities in the conflict, in which both sides agreed to a peace plan brokered by Lebed in August.

Sept. 5—In a taped television interview, President Boris Yeltsin announces that he will undergo surgery for his heart condition.

Sept. 7—Yeltsin and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl meet informally in Moscow; Kohl's visit with Yeltsin, who has rarely been seen in public since his July 3 presidential election victory, is the 1st by a foreign leader since the election.

Sept. 19—Yeltsin signs a decree under which he will cede control over Russia's nuclear arsenal to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin during his upcoming surgery; the president granted similar control over national security and police authority to the prime minister on September 10.

RWANDA

Sept. 23—Rwandan army units and Zairian government troops exchange fire across the border town of Bukavu; tension has been building between Hutu militia members among Rwandan refugees in Zaire and Tutsi who are residents of the area.

Sept. 27—The UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda genocide trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, the former mayor of the town of Taba, is postponed for 1 month; his lawyer had argued he had not had the resources to prepare a sufficient defense, and that the prosecution had refused to share crucial evidence; Akayesu, accused of directing militia in the murder of 2,000 people, will be the 1st person to be tried by the tribunal.

SIERRA LEONE

Sept. 9—Three soldiers are arrested on charges of plotting to ambush President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and overthrow the elected civilian government.

SOMALIA

Sept. 18—Daniel Suther, a US Agency for International Development worker who was abducted in Mogadishu yesterday, is released; a Somali faction leader says his abduction resulted from mistaken identity.

Sept. 23—Fighting between 2 rival groups, al-Ittihad and the Somali National Front, sparks an Ethiopian artillery attack on the border town of Dolow; al-Ittihad says 8 of its fighters and 5 Ethiopian soldiers were killed.

SOUTH AFRICA

Sept. 2—*The New York Times* reports that Bantu Holomisa, a high-level African National Congress (ANC) official and former deputy minister of the environment, has been stripped of his party membership; Holomisa disclosed a month ago that President Nelson Mandela accepted a campaign contribution from a businessman under investigation for bribery.

Sept. 6—The Constitutional Court rejects the country's new constitution, saying that it fails to meet several criteria agreed upon in transition talks in 1994; chief among the court's objections are concerns that the senate under the new constitution would be too weak; the ruling is regarded as an important demonstration of the court's independence from the ANC; the ANC and the National Party, the 2 leading parties, said that the document can easily be revised to accommodate the court's objections before the deadline 3 months from now.

Sept. 11—Major General Marius Oelschig tells Archbishop Desmond Tutu's Truth and Reconciliation Commission that he gave the order to open fire in the 1992 "Bisho Massacre," in which 29 people died; Oelschig is currently in charge of bringing democratic accountability to the post-apartheid South African National Defense Force.

Sept. 18—Eugene de Kock, the head of an infamous police unit during the apartheid era, finishes his 3d day of testimony before a judge at a sentencing on abuses during his career; he described a highly organized, well-financed operation known to most police officers and high government officials; contradicting de Klerk's recent testimony, de Kock charged that both de Klerk and former president P. W. Botha knew about or gave orders for assaults on ANC members.

Sept. 23—Police say that at least 18 people have been killed in 2 days of fighting between workers at Buffelsfontein gold mine, northwest of Johannesburg; the clashes were apparently sparked by rivalry between members of the Pondo and Sotho ethnic groups.

Sept. 26—De Kock testifies that Craig Williamson, one of the apartheid regime's most notorious spies in the 1970s and 1980s, played a role in organizing the 1986 assassination of Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden; Williamson headed Operation Long Reach, a program designed to silence, harass, and spy on opponents of the apartheid government abroad.

SRI LANKA

Sept. 26—Tamil guerrillas kill at least 100 government soldiers in a counterattack to an army offensive on the Tamil stronghold of Kilinochchi.

Sept. 28—Tamil rebel reinforcements arrive at Kilinochchi as the battle for the stronghold intensifies; more than 800 people have died in the past week's fighting.

THAILAND

Sept. 21—Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa announces he will resign within 7 days; Banharn had been accused of economic mismanagement, bribery, land speculation, and tax evasion.

TURKEY

Sept. 5—Turkish planes strike rebel bases in northern Iraq and Turkish troops mass on the border with Iraq; the government has said it plans to set up a "buffer zone" in northern Iraq against attacks from the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a guerrilla group that has fought for 12 years to establish an independent state in what is now southeastern Turkey.

Sept. 20—Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller says that her government has urged Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to assert his authority in northern Iraq; if the Iraqi army or some other force can chase PKK guerrillas out of northern Iraq, she says, Turkey will drop its plan of establishing a "buffer zone" there.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

Sept. 23—In a series of pre-dawn raids in London, police kill 1 IRA terrorist suspect, arrest 5 others, and discover some 10 tons of explosives and weapons.

Sept. 25—British authorities acknowledge that Diarmuid O'Neill, the man killed by police in a London raid 2 days ago, was unarmed, as Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA, had charged.

UNITED STATES

Sept. 5—A federal district court jury convicts Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Adul Hakim Murad, and Wali Khan Amin Shah of participating in a plan to carry out bombings on American landmarks and commercial airliners; Yousef now awaits trial on charges that he orchestrated the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York. ∎

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GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND POPULATION STRESSES

Annual Population Growth Rate
(in percent)

- More than 4.0
- 3.1–4.0
- 2.1–3.0
- 1.0–2.0
- Less than 1.0
- No data

Environmental Stresses

- G   Major CO₂ emitters
- Df   Deforestation
- Ds   Desertification
- F   Depleted fisheries
- ⊙   Increased radiation from ozone depletion
- W   Water scarcity

Note: Environmental stress symbols indicate regional problems, not specific locations or countries. Each stress is widespread; the regions indicated on the map are leading examples.

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